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ABSTRACT
My thesis examines the ways in which narratives about Axis-occupied
Yugoslavia developed within the United States over the course of World War II and
identifies how these narratives influenced the development of American foreign
policy. Methodologically, I utilize the literary theories of Northrop Frye and Hayden
White as a means of narrative analysis. Frye categorizes narratives as romance,
comedy, tragedy, or satire. Each of these modes of employment serves as a call to
action or, in the case of satire, inaction. The initial narrative related to occupied
Yugoslavia was romance, and it served as a call for the United States to aid the Četnik
resistance. The romantic narrative of Četnik resistance was, in part, supplanted by the
romance of the communist Partisans due to the ways in which Četnik ideology
conflicted with American ideals and the US government’s comedic narrative of
national and international unity. Many Americans became dissatisfied with US policy
toward Yugoslavia and framed the cause of this dissatisfaction in terms of a moral
failing, giving rise to the tragic narrative. This narrative called for the United States to
return to its ideals and assume a more constructive role in Yugoslavia. However, the
tragic narrative was ultimately undermined by the satirical narrative. The satirical
view of Yugoslavia drew upon preconceived notions of a Balkan propensity for
violence and disorder. It discouraged the US from becoming politically involved in
Yugoslavia, and its emergence explains US foreign policy, or lack thereof, toward
Yugoslavia at the end of World War II.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 26, 1946, The New York Times printed the review of an “odd little
book,” George Orwell’s Animal Farm. After walking its readers through Orwell’s
critique of totalitarianism, the book review concluded by noting that the book served
as reminder of the “ancient cycle of revolution—first brotherhood, then organization,
then tyranny.”1 Neither the New York Times reviewer nor the rest of Orwell’s
American audience was privy to the book’s original preface, which was omitted from
both the US and British versions. In it, Orwell castigated the complicity of “the
English intelligentsia” in the uncritical propagation of Soviet propaganda. The most
egregious instance of this behavior was to be found in the treatment of General
Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, the leader of the Četnik resistance to the Axis occupation
of Yugoslavia during World War II. According to Orwell,
the Russians, who had their own Yugoslav protege in Marshal Tito,
accused [Mihailović] of collaboration with the Germans. This
accusation was promptly taken up by the British press: [Mihailović’s]
supporters were given no chance of answering it and the facts
contradicting it were simply kept out of print. In July of 1943 the
Germans offered a reward of 100,000 gold crowns for the capture of
Tito, and similar reward for the capture of [Mihailović]. The British
press ‘splashed’ the reward for Tito, but only one paper mentioned (in
small print) the reward for [Mihailović]: and the charges of
collaborating with the Germans continued.2
At the time that Animal Farm was published, Orwell’s original preface would have
undoubtedly found a receptive audience in the United States. The month prior to the
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Orville Prescott, “Books of the Times,” New York Times, August 26, 1946, accessed February 3, 2018,
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release of Animal Farm in the US, Mihailović was executed in Yugoslavia after being
found guilty of “treason against the people and the Fatherland” in the form of
“political and military collaboration with the invader.”3
The government and private citizens of the United States attempted to intercede
on Mihailović’s behalf in 1946. In response to a radio announcement in Belgrade that
Mihailović had been captured on March 13, the State Department sent a message to
the Yugoslav Foreign Office. The note proclaimed that Mihailović “organized and led
important resistance forces against the occupiers… [and] without adequate supplies
and fighting under the greatest hardships contributed with his forces materially to the
allied cause so heroically participated in by Yugoslavia.” In closing, the message
stated that the US government was “confident that in the interests of justice the
Yugoslav Government” would avail itself of the evidence that was currently being
compiled within the United States in defense of Mihailović.4 The Yugoslav
government was not receptive to this appeal and replied that “the crimes of the traitor
Draza Mihailovich against the people of Yugoslavia are far too big and horrible that it
could be or should be allowed to be discussed whether he is guilty or not.”5
In light of the United States’ encouragement of Yugoslav resistance to the Axis
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The Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović: Stenographic Record and Documents from the Trial of
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United States Department of State, “U.S. Note on the Capture of General Mikhailovich,” The
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powers over the course of World War II, it is understandable that the US government
felt compelled to assist Mihailović. Following the invasion of Yugoslavia, the United
States and Britain originally supported Mihailović as the leader of the Yugoslav
resistance against the occupation forces. However, from the emergence of concerted
resistance activity in Yugoslavia in 1941 through mid-1943, this support was largely
moral rather than material.6 By the time that the US government was prepared to send
military representatives and more substantial aid to Yugoslavia, the Allies had become
aware of a rival resistance organization, the communist-led Partisans headed by Josip
Broz “Tito.”7 The US government initially sent military liaisons to both groups.8
However, in 1944, the US and Britain withdrew their joint military mission to
Mihailović and gave their full support to Tito.9 By the end of the war, the Partisans’
military superiority to Mihailović’s royalist Četniks placed Tito in a position to reject
the return of the Yugoslav king and to seize political control of postwar Yugoslavia.10
This sequence of events led many to ask why it was that the United States had not only
abandoned its erstwhile military ally, but also apparently played a part in bringing
6

Hugh de Santis, “In Search of Yugoslavia: Anglo-American Policy and Policy-Making 1943-45,”
Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (July, 1981): 542, accessed August 18, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260320.
7
A total of approximately 23 tons of supplies had been dropped to Mihailović by June 1943. Walter B.
Roberts, Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 119.
Once the Allies began shipping supplies from the Italian coast in 1943, their ability to aid the resistance
forces expanded significantly. The Partisans were the primary beneficiaries. They received over 5,600
tons of supplies between October 1943 and January 1944. The Četniks received only 27 tons of
supplies over this same time period. Andrew Buchanan, American Grand Strategy in the
Mediterranean during World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 244.
8
The first Office of Strategic Service liaisons parachuted into Yugoslavia in August 1943. They were
initially assigned to the British missions that had already been established with both Tito and
Mihailović. Kirk Ford, Jr., OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1941-1945 (College Station, Texas A&M
University Press, 1992), 3-4.
9
After the departure of the British mission, and much to the chagrin of Churchill, the United States
maintained a presence among the Četniks in the form of two subsequent missions, though neither was
tasked with aiding Mihailović. One was strictly an intelligence mission and the other was tasked with
evacuating downed US airmen. The personnel associated with these missions were withdrawn in
November and December of 1944. This severed all direct US contact with Mihailović. Ibid., 131-133.
10
Ibid., 31.
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about the rise of the communist regime that subsequently tried and executed him. It is
this question that lies at the heart of this paper.
In his explanation of US policy on Yugoslavia, David Martin, who served as
secretary for the Commission of Inquiry that had compiled the above-mentioned
testimony of US servicemen in defense of Mihailović in 1946, arrived at a conclusion
similar to that of George Orwell. However, the communist influence that Martin
identified was far more extensive than even Orwell suggested. As Martin wrote in
Ally Betrayed,
even in the heart of democratic England and America, the Soviets are
able to exercise certain totalitarian controls in their own interest.
Employing… the influence of party-members and fellow [travelers] in
key positions… they were able to compel the suppression of news, to
obtain the currency of expedient lies, and even to contrive the
falsification of British and American military intelligence. The simple
fact is that Britain and America were duped into supporting Tito.11
Martin’s assertions were not merely a manifestation of anti-communist hysteria driven
by fears associated with the emerging Cold War, although they undoubtedly were a
reflection of this as well. There is substantial evidence of the presence of communists
and their ideological sympathizers within the ranks of both the British Special
Operations Executive (SOE) and its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS). Possible infiltration of the OSS aside, if there was a decisive
communist influence on British policy from within the SOE, this would invariably
have impacted US policy. Wherever British policy led in Yugoslavia, at least in
regard to military liaison and supply operations, the Americans invariably followed,
though often not immediately or without protest. This can be seen in the initial

11
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decision to back both Tito and Mihailović, as well as in the eventual decision to
remove all Allied liaisons from the Četniks.12
There has been particular attention paid to the influence that James Klugmann, a
Soviet mole within the SOE, had upon Allied policy toward the Yugoslav resistance
groups. In one of his later books, Web of Disinformation, Martin argued that
Klugmann was “primarily [Martin’s emphasis] responsible” for the “handing over [of]
a nation [Yugoslavia] of 15 million people to Communist control” through the
manipulation of intelligence information in favor of the Partisans.13 In his memoir,
The Rape of Serbia, Michael Lees, one of the British liaison officers assigned to
Mihailović, recounted his apoplectic reaction upon reading Basil Davidson’s account
of the “shenanigans” in which Davidson and fellow leftist members of SOE, to include
Klugmann, engaged at the British headquarters in Cairo, ultimately leading “to
Churchill’s dramatic modification of Yugoslav policy” in favor of the Partisans.14
While there is substantial evidence that Klugmann’s communist sympathies drove
his activities within SOE, historian Roderick Bailey questioned the extent of
Klugmann’s influence upon policy. That Klugmann perceived that he wielded
significant influence upon policy is shown in Bailey’s essay, “Communist in SOE.”
In a conversation, which Bailey suspected was captured by British intelligence via a
listening device, between Klugmann and a member of the British Communist Party,
Klugmann explained that
the first political aim was to get permission for our Yugoslav section to
12

Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 181.
David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder (San Diego, California:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), xix.
14
Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944 (San Diego,
California: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), 18-25.
13
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learn from Intelligence sources about Partisans, to show that there were
Partisans as well as Chetniks. That took about three months - a fight
with the Foreign Office and War Office, and GHQ Middle East.
The second step was to get permission to send certain agents not
only to the Chetniks but to the Partisans… that was another three
months, fighting, persuading, documents organizing, every type of
work.
The next three months was to get permission to send arms to the
people that were Partisans as well as arms to the Chetniks.
The next three months, four months about, was to get
permission to send people to support the Partisans in Serbia, which was
the area where Mihailovitch was strongest. Previously we’d only been
allowed to send them to other areas.
The next stage—again for four or five months—was… skewing
[and] building up reports we were getting from the Chetniks and…
from the Partisans - [to show that there was] no activity against the
enemy on the Chetnik side, [but] first-class activity on the Partisan side
- [in order] to recall the missions from the Chetniks, and to give all
support to the Partisans.
And the last stage… was to fight inside the organisation [for]…
political recognition of the Partisans.15
Although Klugmann gave himself and his machinations credit for the shift in British
policy as it related to the Partisans, Bailey was skeptical of this assertion. According
to Bailey, the “key decisions in favour of Tito were taken well above the heads of
SOE” and were based upon “important intelligence to which the SOE staff officers
had little or no access.”16
Bailey’s dismissal of Klugmann’s significance was reflective of the increasing
credence given by historians to the claim that the ULTRA intercepts were far more
influential in the formulation of British policy toward Yugoslavia than were any

15

Roderick Bailey, “Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmannn’s Recruitment and Retention,”
in The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946, ed. Neville
Wylie (London: Routledge, 2012), 69-70. The “organisation” to which Klugmann referred was the
SOE.
16
Ibid., 71. “ULTRA” was the name given to the Anglo-American decrypts of German, Italian, and
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reports from the SOE.17 Historian Heather Williams even suggested in Parachutes,
Patriots, and Partisans that Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, a member of British
Parliament and also head of the SOE mission to Tito, possibly served as a cover to
explain Churchill’s decision to switch support to Partisans and mask Churchill’s
reliance upon ULTRA intercepts as the basis for the change in Yugoslav policy.18
Kirk Ford, Jr. made clear in OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance that communist
influence was not limited to the SOE. According to Ford, the OSS headquarters in
Bari, Italy gained the epithet of the “Little Kremlin” due to the influence of Partisan
sympathizers such as Major Francis Arnoldy, chief of the OSS Secret Intelligence (SI)
Yugoslav section.19 Robert Joyce, one of Arnoldy’s predecessors as chief of the
Yugoslav section, recounted in his unpublished memoir that he was informed prior to
assuming his post in Cairo that several of his employees were “probable communists
or at least fellow travelers.” This was of concern, as SI “was supposed to report
objectively military and especially political developments for American military and
political policymakers.”20 Joyce had assumed overall head of SI in Bari and was thus
Arnoldy’s supervisor. He eventually had Arnoldy transferred for not following State
Department policy and for his unabashedly “pro-Partisan” activity.21 It thus seems
that the US personnel were cognizant of communist infiltration within the OSS and
increasingly wary of and proactive in neutralizing such influences in comparison to
their SOE counterparts. The awareness of American personnel of communist
17

John Cripps, “Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose,” in Action this
Day, eds. Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith (New York: Bantam Press, 2001), 262-3.
18
Heather Williams, Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive in
Yugoslavia 1941- 1945 (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 168.
19
Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 82.
20
Robert Prather Joyce, “Chapter Twelve - Yugoslav Resistance 1941-1944,” Robert P. Joyce Papers,
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, 3.
21
Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 85.
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infiltration at the time, combined with the recent recognition of the importance of the
ULTRA intercepts, has increasingly led scholars to dismiss the impact of communist
influence on the trajectory of US and British policy toward Yugoslavia during World
War II.
Rather than crediting communist conspiracy as the driver of US policy-making,
many historians have instead emphasized the role played by military exigency. As
Walter Roberts stated in Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945, “the United
States had only military and strategic considerations in mind in the Balkans. It
believed that if Tito was fighting and Mihailović was not, then Tito should be
supported.”22 While Roberts did mention communist propaganda, he attributed little
significance to it. For instance, Radio Free Yugoslavia, broadcasting from the Soviet
Union, began accusing Mihailović of collaboration in 1942. This accusation was then
quickly picked up by the communist periodical, The Daily Worker, in the United
States.23 As Roberts noted, by late 1942, mainstream publications such as The
Saturday Evening Post and Time began publishing articles that praised the Partisans
and repeated the accusations of military inactivity and collaboration on the part of
Mihailović. However, Roberts stated that “the US government… dismissed all of
these charges and continued to credit Mihailović with all resistance in Yugoslavia.”24
Instead, Roberts emphasized the impact of a report by Major Linn Farish, an OSS
liaison with Tito, that FDR received immediately prior to the Tehran Conference.
During this conference, the decision was ultimately made to switch full Allied support
to Tito. Roberts claimed that the report “dramatically changed FDR’s view of the
22

Roberts, Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 184.
Ibid., 62.
24
Ibid., 75-6.
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Yugoslav situation.” In describing this impact, Roberts paid particular attention to the
portions of the report that deemphasized the communist character of the Partisans
while extolling their dedication to fighting the Axis. Roberts also quoted Farish’s
observations on the Četniks’ consistent failure to attack the occupiers and their
preoccupation with fighting the Partisans.25
Ford, despite his previously mentioned description of communist infiltration of
the OSS, also identified military concerns as the foundation of US decision-making on
Yugoslavia and dismissed the notion that communists significantly influenced
policy.26 At the time of the Tehran Conference, “the current status of the war…
dictated the necessity of according primacy to military over political matters” in the
formulation of US policy.27 Unlike Roberts, Ford dismissed even the impact of the
Farish report and concluded that it “had little, or any, impact on the course of Allied
policy.”28 Instead, this report merely served as confirmation of the wisdom of FDR’s
efforts to stay out of the Balkans and thus avoid becoming entangled with suspected
British designs in the region with which the United States disagreed.29
The trajectory of the historiography, as outlined above, demonstrates an increased
focus upon geo-political and strategic concerns with a simultaneous deemphasis of the
historical significance of narratives as they related to American involvement in
Yugoslavia. Also, as indicated by Roberts’ evaluation of the lack of impact that the
US press had upon American policy, this historiographical trend belies the
significance of the contemporary emotive valence of certain categorizations, such as
25

Ibid., 152.
Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 183.
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Ibid., 35.
29
Ibid., 12.
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collaborator and resister or communist and reactionary. The largely discredited
historiographical obsession with the influence of communist propaganda, whatever its
faults, at least recognized the tendency of narratives to shape action. This recognition
explains the preoccupation of those like Martin with the ways in which communist
propaganda came to be repeated in the mainstream press and within governmental
circles. This recognition also meant that those who fixated upon communist influence
were often more attentive to the link between domestic discourse and international
developments.
In the pages that follow, it is not my intention to resurrect the historiographical
bogeyman of communist subversion, but rather to recenter the narrative as an
historically significant factor in understanding US-Yugoslav relations during World
War II. It is not my contention that these narratives served as the sole impetus for US
policy. Instead, I argue that narratives represented a rhetorical and imaginative arena
that served as the space in which policy regarding Yugoslavia was formed. The
boundaries of this space were not fixed, and private citizens and governmental
officials contended with one another in their attempts to circumscribe or expand them.
This contest was informed by and appealed to the ideals, aspirations, preconceptions,
and anxieties of its participants and audience.
According to historian Warren F. Kimball, World War II has increasingly been
viewed “as little more than the origins of the Cold War,” but this context can be
overemphasized as it relates to foreign policy and public opinion during World War

10

II.30 Although George F. Kennan would not coin the term “containment” until 1947,
curtailing Soviet expansion nonetheless weighed upon the mind of Roosevelt
throughout World War II.31 As I show in the chapters that follow, it also concerned
members of the American press and the Yugoslav government-in-exile (YGE), as one
area into which Soviet influence seemed to be encroaching was occupied Yugoslavia.
However, this concern led some to subsequently confuse hindsight with foresight in
explaining US decision-making regarding Yugoslavia during the Second World War.
For example, diplomat Robert Murphy claimed that US knowledge of Tito’s Yugoslav
nationalism meant that the US anticipated Tito’s eventual break with Stalin in 1948,
thus presumably demonstrating the wisdom of the United States’ foreign policy during
World War II.32 However, as Partisan leader Milovan Djilas noted in his memoir
Wartime, Tito never gave the Western powers reason to doubt his “ideological link
with the USSR.”33
Instead of narrowing the historical lens to focus upon US concerns about the
spread of communism, expanding the scope of historical inquiry regarding USYugoslav relations during World War II has the potential to identify trends within US
foreign policy that transcend the Cold War context. According to historians Michael
Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan, US foreign policy has often been articulated by
juxtaposing the image of the United States against “an ‘other,’” that is “a simplified
depiction” of the culture in question. Cullinane and Ryan also called attention to the
30

Warren F. Kimball, “The Second Word War: Not (Just) the Origins of the Cold War,” in War and
Cold War in American Foreign Policy, eds. Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (New York: Palgrave, 2002),
31.
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Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4.
32
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Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), 348.

11

“notion of superiority and inferiority running through such discourse.”34 Although the
language used in this discourse has evolved from one “of racial hierarchies,
civilization, and barbarism” to one of “development, modernity, and tradition… the
hierarchy” has remained “the same.”35 Despite the fact that there is a “government
monopoly” on the formulation and execution of US foreign policy, political scientist
Charles O. Lerche, Jr. noted that US policy must nonetheless take into account “the
demands of the democratic public.”36 In this way, defining “us” and the “other,” and
determining what constitutes the proper relationship between these two entities, can be
seen as a process engaged in by both the American government and public. The
development of narratives related to occupied Yugoslavia exemplifies this process.
Methodologically, I utilize the narrative theory of Hayden White and literary
theory of Northrop Frye.37 I categorize the evolution of wartime narratives about
Yugoslavia using the “modes of emplotment" identified by Frye and used as means of
historiographical criticism by Hayden White: romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire.38
I describe the characteristics of these narratives in detail at the beginning of each of
the following chapters.
34

Michael Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan, introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other, eds.
Michael Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 2.
35
Ibid., 5.
36
Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy and the American People (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), 3.
37
These theories can be found, respectively, in Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination
in 19th-Century Europe, Fortieth-Anniversary Edition (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University
Press, 2014) and Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, 15th ed. (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2000). In Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1986), Lynn Hunt demonstrates the usefulness of Frye’s
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38
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The ways in which Americans spoke and wrote about occupied Yugoslavia, and
thus contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of certain narratives, not only
reflected their own evolving views and ideals, but also contributed to a wider
discourse. The trajectory of this discourse, in turn, served as a call for a particular US
policy of action or inaction in Yugoslavia.39 Thus, an examination of these narratives
has the potential to provide insight into not only the prevailing mentalité among
different segments of US society that were concerned with the course of events in
Yugoslavia, but also how these mentalités interacted with US foreign policy.
The sources that I use to identify the genesis and propagation of relevant
narratives tend to be those generated by what historian Benjamin Alpers refers to as
“cultural producers.” According to Alpers, this “heterogenous set of cultural elites”
was able to define American views through either “access to the mass media [or] of
having expert status.”40 This included members of the mainstream and foreign
language press, US and foreign government officials, and prominent citizens, such as
Louis Adamic and Ruth Mitchell. As will be seen, communists played an outsized
role as successful “cultural producers.” However, rather than focusing upon this
success as the result of some insidious conspiracy, I instead place it within the context
of competing viewpoints. When analyzed from this perspective, the significance of
communist rhetoric was not that it contributed to the installation of a communist
regime in Yugoslavia, but rather that Americans were more receptive and sympathetic
39

Hunt describes the rhetoric of the French Revolution as not merely reflective of “changes and
conflict, but rather was itself transformed into an instrument of political and social change.” Hunt,
Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 24. Narratives can also be an impediment to
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40
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to the narratives they propagated in pursuit of these ends. In contrast, the narratives
produced by Mihailović’s supporters failed to either generate or maintain a similar
degree of support because they did not resonate with either the American public or
governmental officials to the same degree as those of their competitors.
In the first chapter of this thesis I examine the emergence of the romantic
narrative that portrayed Mihailović as a paragon of European resistance to Nazi
domination. I argue that the initial receptivity to this narrative was based upon
established American notions about the fighting spirit of the heroic, but primitive,
Serbians. I believe that this is a manifestation of what Maria Todorova termed
“balkanism,” which both served and then undermined the cause of Mihailović’s
American proponents.41 I also provide an historical overview of US diplomatic and
military involvement in Yugoslavia leading up to the emergence of organized
resistance. This is important for establishing the wider context in which US narratives
about Yugoslavia arose. In doing so, I attempt to ensure that in the process of
emphasizing the significance of these narratives, I do not simultaneously
decontextualize US foreign policy decisions from the very real strategic and geopolitical concerns with which American policymakers had to contend.
In chapter three, I examine the ways in which the heroic image of Mihailović was
eroded through accusations that he was not only collaborating with the Axis, but that
he was also a reactionary Serb chauvinist. As I show, these qualities increasingly came
into conflict with the comedic narrative that was promoted by the US government to
combat disunity within the domestic Yugoslav-American community, the YGE, and
between Tito’s and Mihailović’s forces. I also examine how the competing romantic
41
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narrative of Tito and the Partisans arose at the same time that Mihailović’s heroism
was being called into question.
Chapter four consists of an examination of the ironic and tragic narratives about
Yugoslavia. I argue that Yugoslav disunity served to confirm American beliefs
regarding the Balkans in yet another manifestation of balkanism, which in turn
discouraged US involvement in Yugoslavia’s internal political disputes.

15

CHAPTER 1

MIHAILOVIĆ ASCENDANT: THE ROMANCE OF RESISTANCE

The cover of the May 25, 1942 issue of Time magazine bore the image of a
uniformed military man with a furrowed brow. He appeared to be middle-aged and
wore a trimmed mustache but was otherwise clean-shaven. In the background stood
the entrance of a cave, where an armed soldier looked out over a distant valley. While
Time stated that this painting of Mihailović was rendered by one of his compatriots, it
bore little resemblance to the 50-year old, bespectacled man with an unruly and
greying beard who was currently waging guerrilla warfare within Yugoslavia. The
cover’s corresponding article, entitled “The Eagle of Yugoslavia,” informed its readers
that Mihailović was the leader of what was “probably the greatest guerrilla operation
in history” and that “as a legend, Draža Mihailovich will unquestionably live as long
as World War II is remembered.” Time’s visual depiction of Mihailović and the
hyperbolic description of his exploits are representative of the way in which the
majority of the rest of US press originally presented the story of Yugoslav resistance
to the American public. Unfortunately for Mihailović and those within the United
States that championed his cause, the reality of the Yugoslavian conflict and the
activities and goals of the Četnik movement came into increasing conflict with this
simplistic narrative of Serbian heroism.42
Among the “modes of emplotment” that White suggests are available to the
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narrator of historical events, the initial portrayal of Mihailović’s resistance to Nazi
occupation can best be described as romance.43 According to Frye, the romantic
narrative is based upon chivalric “knight-errantry.”44 Krapfl interprets romance as “a
quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil.”45 In the romance, the heroic
protagonist is capable of “marvelous” actions because the “the ordinary laws of nature
are slightly suspended.”46 In this chapter, I first discuss preconceptions of the Balkans
in general, and the Serbs in particular, as an explanation for the alacrity with which the
US press adopted romance as the framework for its portrayal of Mihailović. I then
provide an overview of American involvement in Yugoslavia leading up to the point
of the Nazi invasion. After describing the impetus for the emergence of resistance in
Yugoslavia, I look at the way in which Mihailović was initially presented to the
American public. As will be seen, the romantic narrative and the specific components
used in its construction were problematic as a framework for understanding, and
establishing expectations of, the Četnik resistance.
According to Maria Todorava’s concept of “balkanism,” Western views of the
Balkans were informed by and reflected in “a discourse of imputed ambiguity.”47 This
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ambiguity stemmed from the Balkans state of liminality, or in-betweeness, in regard to
its geography, culture, and racial makeup.48 Sitting astride a civilizational crossroads,
Yugoslavia was culturally and ethnically diverse. It included within its population
predominantly Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Serbs, and a substantial
Muslim minority.49 Developmentally, the Balkans had not achieved Western
standards of modernity, but were instead in an “intermediary state somewhere between
barbarity and civilization.”50 While the relegation of the Balkans to such a
comparatively primitive state bore with it ostensibly negative connotations,
particularly in regard to a presumed propensity for violence, there could be ambiguity
here as well. According to Eugene Michail, “Western attitudes” toward Balkan
violence “changed according to cross-national and ideological or national and strategic
priorities, producing a variety of images that competed, co-existed and alternated
between different sections of the Western public.”51
The most visible US attitude toward the potential for Balkan bellicosity at the
time of the German invasion of Yugoslavia can best be described as a manifestation of
Serbophilia. Historian Ivo Tasovac traces this American Serbophilia to the
Romanticism of the late nineteenth century, when Romantics developed a vision of
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Serbian preeminence among the South Slavs that found sympathy and took root in an
American society “that was going through its own romantic development of AngloSaxon racial nationalism.” Serbian participation in the Balkan Wars and World War I
served to further entrench within the American imagination an image of the Serb as
“an innately heroic person—natural, undisciplined, and in love with personal
freedom.”52
FROM CREATION TO DISMEMBERMENT
Although the United States supported the creation of Yugoslavia in the immediate
aftermath of World War I and defended the nascent state against territorial
encroachment by the Italians, this American flirtation with Wilsonian internationalism
was not to survive the interwar years.53 The negligible economic ties between the two
countries undoubtedly contributed to the fact that Yugoslavia remained on the
52
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periphery of US foreign policy concerns for most of this period.54 US relations with
Yugoslavia were also reflective of a more general trend within American diplomacy.
The Great Depression and disillusionment regarding US participation in First World
War had left Americans with little appetite for involvement in European affairs. If this
was true for Western Europe, it was doubly so for the Balkans. As historian George
C. Herring notes, the United States “scrupulously avoided the numerous, complex, and
volatile issues that divided peoples and governments against each other.”55 This
policy dovetailed nicely with the prevailing isolationist sentiments in America at the
outset of World War II.56 However, with the Nazi conquest of France and the Low
Countries in 1940, a realization grew among Americans that their own security was at
risk and that direct US involvement in the war was increasingly likely.57
Axis aggression in the Balkans precipitated unprecedented American interest and
involvement in Yugoslav affairs. In pursuit of his expansionist ambitions for
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Mediterranean hegemony, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Greece on October 28,
1940.58 While Hitler was not opposed to Italy’s attack on Greece in principle, his
approval for such an undertaking was predicated upon the assumption of its military
success.59 Instead, poor preparation, in which Mussolini’s hubris undoubtedly played
no small part, ensured that the invasion was a debacle. The Italian offensive almost
immediately ground to a halt. Of even greater concern to Germany, the British, in
keeping with their prior guarantee of Greek independence, responded to the invasion
by providing military assistance to Greece.60 The developing situation in Greece
exposed Germany’s southern flank and posed an unacceptable threat to the invasion of
the Soviet Union that Hitler planned for the following year.61 It thus became clear that
Germany would have to intervene in Greece on Italy’s behalf. Hitler informed the
Italians that he would not be able to provide military relief until spring of 1941. In the
interim, he embarked upon a campaign of diplomacy in the region in order to smooth
the way for the swift deployment of German troops into Greece and minimize any
impact this diversion might have on his plans regarding the Soviet Union.62
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Hitler was increasingly concerned about Yugoslavia, which not only remained
neutral and adamant in its refusal of the passage of German troops through Yugoslav
territory, but was also being courted by the British and Americans.63 While Hitler
endeavored to create a crescent of Axis-allied states as a secure land route to Greece,
the British worked to persuade Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to join together in a
united Balkan front in order to resist further German intrusion into the region.64
However, Yugoslavia entered into a nonaggression pact with Germany in early
December. At approximately this same time, Mussolini requested that Hitler pressure
Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact in order to draw Greek troops to the Yugoslav
border and away from the stalled Albanian front. In turn, Nazi Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed the German representative in Belgrade to inform
the Yugoslavian government that the nonaggression pact was insufficient as a basis for
the relationship with Yugoslavia that the Germans "envisaged.”65
In order to aid the British in their effort to counter German overtures and stiffen
the resolve of the Balkan states, the future head of the OSS, William Donovan,
embarked upon a tour of the region in January 1941.66 His visit with the Yugoslav
regent, Prince Paul, on January 23, 1941 initially appeared to have succeeded in
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encouraging the formation of a regional alliance.67 The State Department
representative in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, reported on January 25 that
[Prince Paul] stated flatly Yugoslavia would refuse consent of the
passage of German troops and would resist attack. In reply to questions
as to what his country would do if German troops entered Bulgaria he
said, “It is most difficult. I believe we will attack. [Germany entry into
Bulgaria] encircles us. But my people are not all agreed. The time has
come to act on principle, to abandon expediency.” He still felt that
Germany did not wish trouble in the Balkans. After discussion he said
that the establishment of a Balkan line was necessary in order to finally
defeat Germany.68
The British Foreign Office (FO) also reported to the State Department that Turkey was
engaged with Yugoslavia in discussions over “common action” and asked that the
United States’ representatives in the respective countries “encourage the Yugoslav and
Turkish Governments to follow up this initial effort.”69 Secretary of State Cordell
Hull was noncommittal in his response to the British suggestion.70 He also informed
Lane that it was not the policy of the Department of State “to initiate directly such a
policy” as the establishment of a Balkan union in opposition to Nazi aggression.71
Hull’s response to his minister and the British may seem odd considering the
apparent purpose of Donovan’s visit to the Balkans at the president’s behest. By all
appearances, American foreign policy of noninterference in the Balkans had not
changed. However, while Hull provided a veneer of diplomatic propriety, others such
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as Donovan and undersecretary of state Welles engaged in what were, according to
diplomatic norms, more questionable activities.72 In addition to his meetings with the
Yugoslav prime minister, foreign minister, and regent, Donovan met with the former
Yugoslav chief of staff, General Dušan Simović, who was “all out to fight the
Germans” and impressed Donovan “very favourably” according to Donovan’s British
travel companion.73 One way in which Simović may have impressed Donovan is
suggested by Donovan’s biographer, Richard Dunlop:
Simović told Donovan that he believed concessions to Germany would
be deadly and would destroy Yugoslavia’s chance to resist invasion.
Certainly the Yugoslavs, tough mountain people with a knowledge of
every pass and crag, would be able to make their rugged terrain an ally.
Donovan and Simović talked over Simović’s plans for a coup d’état
against the government of Prince Paul. The patriots would strike as
soon as the government signed an agreement with the Axis and would
place royal authority in the hands of 17-year-old King Peter, who
agreed that Paul had outlived his usefulness.74
Donovan met with other members of the Yugoslav military as well. He also made
promises of American material aid to Yugoslavia in a meeting with Yugoslav
intelligence officers and asked them to make a list of their requests, despite the fact
that he knew such a request would go unfulfilled.75
Any positive effect that Donovan had appeared to have on the Yugoslav
government proved to be illusory. Hitler, concerned about reports of Yugoslav
military mobilization, grew even less content with Yugoslavia’s neutrality and
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increased pressure on the country to enter into the Tripartite Pact.76 Romania and
Hungary had previously acceded to the alliance in November 1940. Bulgaria became
a signatory in early March 1941.77 With the exception of Greece, Yugoslavia was
surrounded on all sides by members of the Axis alliance. Yugoslavia’s geographic
position and economic reliance upon Germany placed it in an unenviable position.78
In a report to Secretary Hull on March 21, Lane described a meeting he had with
Prince Paul in which Lane attempted to dissuade him from entering into an alliance
with Germany, which now seemed imminent. To Lane’s suggestion that continued
neutrality would maintain Yugoslavia’s “diplomatic integrity” and “reputation
abroad,” Prince Paul retorted that, “You big nations are hard, you talk of honor, but
you are far away.”79 On March 25, Yugoslavia entered into the Tripartite Pact, though
its membership in the Axis alliance was to be short-lived. On March 27, the military
carried out a coup d’état, placing King Peter II on the throne.80 General Simović, the
architect of the coup, was promptly sworn in as prime minister.81
Although Yugoslavia’s entrance into the Tripartite Pact was the occasion for the
coup, Serbian dissatisfaction with the domestic policies of Prince Paul was one of its
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primary underlying causes.82 Chief among these offending policies was the Sporazum,
or agreement, reached between the government and Croatian political leaders in 1939.
Since Yugoslavia’s creation there had been significant tension between the Croats and
Serbs regarding the way in which their respective nationalities and territories would be
incorporated into and governed within the newly formed country. These tensions
could erupt in violence, as they did when a Montenegrin member of the Serb Radical
Party opened fire on and killed multiple Croat colleagues within the Yugoslav
parliament in 1928. In response, King Alexander abolished the parliament and
established a dictatorship.83 He also reorganized Yugoslavia administratively and
created provinces that “ignored… historical and ethnic” boundaries.84
While Croats originally envisioned the establishment of an autonomous Croatian
state within Yugoslavia, many Serbs believed that Croatia should simply be absorbed
into the existing Serbian state and subordinated to its centralized rule.85 Prince Paul
acquiesced to Croatian demands and approved the Sporazum, which created the
Banovina, or province, of Croatia and granted it a significant degree of autonomy and
signaled the return to traditional, ethnically-based administrative borders. This
agreement was met with resentment by many Serbs, who viewed it as a concession
made at the expense of their deservedly dominant role within Yugoslavia and served
to invigorate Serbian nationalism.86
Besides serving as the galvanizing force behind the coup, this nationalism also
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revitalized the idea of a Greater Serbia. According to this scheme, Yugoslavia would
bring in those Serbs who currently resided outside of its borders and rid itself of
minority populations via “population exchanges,” thus allowing the Serbs to reassert
their hegemonic position within the state.87 This Pan-Serb ideology would come to
have an understandably polarizing effect among Yugoslavia’s constituent ethnic
groups. It would also come to be associated with Mihailović and many of his most
ardent supporters within the YGE and Serb-American community.
The accessibility of the heroic Serbian image, and the positive view of its violent
potential, among American journalists is apparent within their reports of the March
coup and expectations regarding the subsequent invasion. For instance, a New York
Times’ headline on April 6, 1941 proclaimed the “Balkans Aflame.” There was no
trepidation about this conflagration. Rather, it was hoped that it would ultimately
consume the Nazi invaders. The article went on to note that
the Serbs are a singing race. Many of their folksongs and war chants
are centuries old. Last week Serbian voices raised in the streets of
Belgrade and many of the singers were marching men…. Southward, in
a mountain fastness, the Yugoslavs were expected to make their stand,
and rely on their national tradition of guerrilla fighting. Such warfare,
with its sudden forays on supply columns and on communications,
might prove formidable, as in the World War, to the German military.88
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This belief in the Serbs’ fighting spirit was soon put to the test, and the immediate
results were not in keeping with the expectation of either the US government or press.
Hitler, furious upon learning of the coup, ordered his military staff “to smash
Yugoslavia militarily and as a state-form.”89 On April 6 the Nazis initiated the
invasion of Yugoslavia with Operation ‘Retribution,’ during which the Luftwaffe
mercilessly bombed the defenseless capital of Belgrade.90 The ensuing ground
invasion was a rout. On April 17, members of the Yugoslav military agreed to an
unconditional surrender in the absence of King Peter and his cabinet, who had fled the
country in the midst of the deteriorating military situation.91 Hitler quickly set about
dismantling the “creation of the hated Versailles system” and partitioned the country
among his allies. In the words of historian Mark Mazower, Yugoslavia “was erased
from the map.”92
Two of the states that emerged from Hitler’s reconfiguration of Yugoslavia were
the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and the residual state of Serbia. The NDH
was headed by Ante Pavelić. Pavelić was the leader of the Ustaše, a fascist and
separatist organization of Croat extremists that emerged following the establishment
of the Yugoslav dictatorship and which directed the subsequent assassination of King
Alexander in 1934.93 General Milan Nedić was appointed as president of the
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collaborationist regime within the puppet state of Serbia.94
Many within the United States were shocked by and sought to explain the speed
with which the Yugoslav army was defeated. Historian Ivo Tasovac assesses that the
overestimation of Yugoslavia’s military capabilities stemmed in part from the
“unusual faith… in the Serbian willingness to fight the Germans” expressed by those
like the US military attaché in Yugoslavia.95 Before the campaign in Yugoslavia was
even over, The New York Times reported that “hopes arose from American surveys
such as that made by Colonel J. Donovan… that the Yugoslavs would fall back to
their difficult mountain country, engage the Germans for a period, knock the Italians
out of Albania and give Hitler his second great problem of the war.” While the article
concluded that the “Nazi air arm and ground machines upset this expectation,” others
looked to a more insidious explanation for Yugoslavia’s humiliating performance.96
According to some, the traitorous Croats were to blame.97 This signaled the
emergence of an anti-Croat propaganda campaign that would become intertwined with
the romantic narrative of Mihailović.
ENTER MIHAILOVIĆ
Following the invasion of Yugoslavia, the US government lost access to firsthand
information about what was happening there. The US minister, Lane, left the country
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on May 17, 1941, and the consulate in Zagreb was closed in June.98 From mid-1941
until the arrival of OSS in operatives in 1943, the US government was largely
dependent upon sources such as the YGE, the Yugoslav émigré community within the
United States, and the British government for information about the Yugoslav
resistance forces and their activities.
For their part, the British were initially no better positioned than the United States
to determine, let alone influence, what was happening within occupied Yugoslavia.
The British apparently underestimated the rapidity and totality with which Yugoslavia
would be defeated.99 Historian Jørgen Hæstrop notes that the military collapse in
Yugoslavia “came so suddenly that neither the SOE nor any other British authority
managed to arrange for any contact in the country. Not so much as a radio
transmission set was left behind, and when later a new fumbling start was made, it had
to be from scratch.”100 It was thus absent any British or American involvement that a
general uprising began in early July, largely as a result of communist initiative.101
Organized resistance to Axis occupation first emerged in Yugoslavia following
the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. This “fundamentally
altered the situation in Yugoslavia,” according to historian Simon Trew, as it put into
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play the two primary resistance groups, the Četniks under Mihailović and the Partisans
under Tito. Prior to the open revolt that the invasion of the Soviet Union ignited, both
groups had avoided engaging either one another or the occupying forces.102 Although
both leaders participated in the rebellion, the defeat of the Germans soon became a
secondary concern for both Mihailović and Tito. Both men quickly came to believe in
the inevitability of Germany’s defeat and expulsion from Yugoslavia.103 This belief
led them to instead focus on ensuring that their individual and mutually-exclusive
visions of Yugoslavia would prevail in the war’s aftermath. Tito, as the leader of the
Communist Party in Yugoslavia, saw the conflict as an opportunity to achieve political
revolution. He also increasingly came to see Mihailović as a reactionary impediment
to this goal.104 Mihailović, a colonel in the defeated Yugoslav army, refused to
recognize capitulation and wanted to maintain “the persistence of the Yugoslav
state.”105 At least some historians have concluded that his ultimate goal was “to create
a greater Serbia” that was to be “based on traditionalist principles.”106 Regardless of
whether or not he was an adherent of Pan-Serbism, Mihailović saw himself as a
representative and defender of the traditional Yugoslavian order. He thus quickly
recognized Tito as the greatest threat to his vision of Yugoslavia’s postwar future.107
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Although Mihailović’s Četniks initially joined the revolt in cooperation with
Partisans, the “uncertain modus vivendi,” by which the two groups agreed to fight the
Axis occupiers rather than one another, quickly collapsed.108 Mihailović felt pressured
into action lest the uprising, and any territory liberated as a consequence of it, fall
entirely under communist control.109 Considering that this was his primary motivation
for entering the fray, it is unsurprising that it was difficult to maintain peace between
the two groups. Cooperation was also undermined by the Četniks’ and Partisans’
“differences in tactics and between the aims of their movements.”110 Tito was much
more willing to engage the occupiers and accept any subsequent reprisals against the
civilian populace than was Mihailović, who wanted to postpone decisive action until
the arrival of the Allies.111 From Tito’s perspective, violence contributed to a
breakdown of society that was conducive to revolution.112 As a result of these
irreconcilable differences, the resistance activities of the Partisans and Chetniks soon
devolved into internecine strife.
As word of the uprising spread, the YGE, which had established itself in London
after fleeing Yugoslavia, officially recognized Mihailović as the leader of the
resistance forces and promoted him from colonel to general.113 Given the choice
between recognizing and advocating for Allied support of either Mihailović or
revolutionary communists, it is understandable that the YGE chose the former. Also,
despite British awareness of the Partisans’ participation in the fighting, the BBC
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originally attributed the uprising to the leadership of Mihailović, contributing to the
rise of the romantic narrative in which he and his Četniks were hailed as the exemplars
of anti-Axis resistance.114 The US press quickly adopted this narrative as well.
The pervasive belief in the Serbs’ fighting prowess was likely a contributing
factor to the numerous reports of heroic feats that flourished following the recognition
of Mihailović as the leader of the rebellion in Yugoslavia. For example, Life
magazine assured its readers on November 24, 1941 that Mihailović’s “army of Serb
patriots today controls a quarter of Yugoslavia and most of the important railway
lines.”115 Similarly, an article in the January 13, 1942, edition of the Chicago Daily
Tribune announced that Mihailović, the “Serb ‘Robin Hood,’” was in “absolute
control of over 20,000 square miles” as a result of his “brilliant undercover
campaign.”116 By August 12, 1942, Yank claimed that Četnik control had expanded to
two-thirds of the country, marking the opening of “a second front.”117
There were other reasons than just Serbophilia that contributed to the seeming
credulity with which these fantastical tales about Mihailović’s military successes were
spread and consumed within the United States. This romantic narrative was at least in
part a result of the lack of firsthand American reporting from the region that held true
for not only the US government, but also for the US press. For example, Ray Brock of
The New York Times, reported prolifically on Yugoslav affairs, but following the
invasion he did so from Ankara. Therefore, he relied upon secondhand sources, such
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as a Serbian “eyewitness” and “the intelligence staffs of several powers,” to provide
the information used in composing articles like the one of February 1, 1942, which
claimed that the Četniks had turned Yugoslavia into “one vast battlefield.”118 Another
factor that contributed to the dominance of this romantic narrative was that the initial
outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia represented one of the few instances of
concerted effort on the part of a conquered people to violently resist absorption into
Hitler’s expanding empire. It would not be until 1943, following the German defeats
at Stalingrad and El Alamein, that the aura of the Wehrmacht’s invincibility was
diminished enough for a belief in the possibility of Germany’s ultimate defeat to
emerge, with a concomitant spread of armed resistance to Nazi occupation throughout
Europe.119 Thus, as the Germans launched what seemed to be yet another successful
Blitzkrieg, this time against the Red Army, during summer of 1941, the news of the
Yugoslav uprising provided a uniquely positive development within occupied Europe
on which the US press might report.
The Četnik successes against the Wehrmacht, a seemingly unstoppable juggernaut
that had conquered much of continental Europe with alarming speed and disconcerting
ease, undoubtedly seemed incredible. According to Paul Fussell the “the Second
World War was a notably secular affair,” marked more by “skepticism” than
superstition.120 Though this would seem to preclude the preternatural heroism of the
archetypal romance, it is hard to describe the above-mentioned exploits of Mihailović,
118

Ray Brock, “‘Either They Die or We Do’: That is the Cry of the Chetniks who Pour Hate on the Nazi
Soldiers in Yugoslavia,” New York Times, February 1, 1942, accessed February 1, 2018,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942/02/01/85514436.html?pageNumber=138.
119
István Deák, Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World
War II (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015),107.
120
Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 51.

34

or their myriad other permutations as reported by the US press, as anything but
miraculous. They also bore little resemblance to the reality of the situation in
Yugoslavia.
The atrocities committed under Axis occupation served as ample proof of the
nature of Mihailović’s enemies. An example of what the Yugoslavs were
experiencing is suggested by a message that King Peter sent to FDR in July 1942:
General [Mihailović] reports on the crimes and massacres committed
on the Serb population by Hungarians and Pavelić’s regime. This
report says that these crimes have now reached the point where city
authorities of Belgrade have officially forbidden swimming in the Sava
and Danube rivers, because their waters, flowing through the regions
occupied by Hungary and Pavelić’s government have been
contaminated by the massacred human bodies floating in their course.
In Belgrade alone during the month of May 760 persons have been
executed by the Germans without trial, explanation, or any apparent
cause.121
Notably, the victims of these and other atrocities were invariably identified as Serbian.
The US press joined in spreading news of the Axis brutality toward the Serbs. One of
the numerous examples of this can be found in The New York Times report that
“reliable sources in Yugoslavia tell a tale of ruthless savagery and horror. In all parts
of Yugoslavia that are inhabited by Serbs, Germans, Hungarians, and Bulgarians are
said to be competing with each other in what reports declare are cold-blooded
massacres aiming at extermination of the Serbian people.”122 The evil of Mihailović’s
adversaries, as evidenced by their treatment of the Serbs, added a Manichaean dualism
to the romantic narrative of Mihailović’s struggle.
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Proponents of Greater Serbia attempted to use these atrocities to further their
agenda. That Yugoslavs in general, and Serbs in particularly, suffered horribly under
occupation is beyond question. The war would leave 1.75 million Yugoslavs, or
approximately 11 percent of the population, dead.123 Serbs suffered particularly harsh
treatment at the hands of the Ustaše within the NDH, where it is estimated that
between 300,000 to over 400,000 Serbs were killed.124 Rather than emphasizing the
culpability of Pavelić and his followers for these atrocities, those seeking to reassert
Serbian hegemony in postwar Yugoslavia instead blamed Croats as a whole. Within
the United States, the primary voice of anti-Croatian propaganda, as well as one of
Mihailović’s most vociferous promoters, was Amerikanski Srbobran, the foreignlanguage paper produced by the Serbian National Federation (SNF).125
Pan-Serbism had an auspicious beginning within the United States, particularly
in regard to anti-Croat sentiment. Many members of the US press were ready to join
the Pan-Serbs in painting the Croats as the traitors responsible for Yugoslavia’s defeat.
There were “traitors under every rock” according to correspondent Cecil B. Brown’s
account of his experience in Yugoslavia during the time of the German invasion.
Besides having his vehicle stopped by a “Croat in Nazi uniform,” he also observed
“Croat fifth columnists” aiding in the identification of “suspiciously loyal Serbs and
Bosnians,” who were then “placed under guard.” As Brown’s interview of a Serb
military commander in the field made clear, the Croats had betrayed Yugoslavia.
A tragic and majestic figure, General Nedelkovitch. Three days before,
this rotund, heavy-faced, mild-mannered, fifty-nine-year-old general
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himself had been engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the German
invaders. Two of his four staff officers had been killed in bayonet
battles with the Nazis. These men were Serbs, General Nedelkovitch
had seen 40 per cent of his troops killed, and 50 per cent, all Croats,
desert or refuse to answer the call to arms.126
Even FDR seemed to be swept up in the Serbophile fervor. According to the
Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Fotić, on December 20, 1941,
Roosevelt responded to a memorandum that detailed Croat atrocities by assuring Fotić
that “the Serbs will rise again as a great people.” The President then went on to
question “how, after such horrible crimes, [the Serbs] could expect to live in the future
in the same state with the Croats.”127 Those that desired to see the creation of a
postwar Greater Serbia were undoubtedly encouraged that the US press and
government seemed to have adopted a sympathetic outlook on Yugoslav affairs.
The narrative of Mihailović’s valiant battle against the forces of evil demanded
that the United States assist him. One of the many examples of this interpretation of
America’s proper relationship to the Četniks can be seen in a message sent to FDR by
his son, who was serving under Donovan in the newly created Office of the
Coordinator of Information (COI), on November 24, 1941.
In the hills of [Yugoslavia], Colonel [Mihailović], a modern Marion,
and 30,000 Serbs, Croats, and Greeks are fighting the Axis. They have
wirelessed a desperate appeal for help to you and Mr. Churchill. The
world is just becoming aware of this battle still raging in the interior of
Europe. The struggle of the Serb guerrillas is as dramatic as the World
War I fight of the Armenians against the Turks…. To aid these people,
to let them know they have made contact with the outside world, to
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show them their pleas have not fallen on deaf ears, we propose to send
a bomber load of medical supplies….128
As evidenced by the above message, the romantic narrative of Četnik resistance
resonated on an emotional level with at least some officials in the US government.
CONCLUSION
The romantic narrative initially garnered significant American sympathy for the
Serbs suffering within Yugoslavia and support for the Četnik cause. However, this
sympathy and support was based upon a superficial understanding of Yugoslavia.
Misinformation and preconceived notions about the Balkans and its inhabitants
contributed to this understanding. This unsound foundation would not be able to bear
the weight of the romantic narrative over time. The image of the Balkans was
malleable, and as word of the conflict between the Četniks and the Partisans began to
filter into the Western press, Americans would prove more than able and willing to
abandon their positive view of Balkan volatility and violence. Also, the reach of
Serbophilia within the United States had its limits, as would be discovered by the
proponents of the Pan-Serb ideology.
Nonetheless, through 1941 and much of 1942, Mihailović was lauded as a hero by
the American press and government officials. Unfortunately for him, US support was
limited primarily to pledges of future aid. The near-term reason for this was a
problem of logistics. This is indicated by a meeting that King Peter had with Donovan
in the United States in November 1942. According to the king’s memoir, he was
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assured that aid for Mihailović “would be forthcoming as soon there were enough
long-range bomber in the Middle East to permit it.”129 There is no reason to doubt the
sincerity of this assurance, as the United States did increase its material support to
Yugoslavia considerably in the coming years. However, by that time the romantic
narrative had, for many Americans, run its course.
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CHAPTER 2

MIHAILOVIĆ: THE REACTIONARY AND RACIST COLLABORATOR

In 1944, the military intelligence staff of the Allied Force Headquarters in the
Mediterranean Theatre published a confidential report detailing the activities of the
Četniks that presented Mihailović in a far less flattering light than did the earlier
romantic narrative. It focused on the ways in which Mihailović “placed in the
forefront of his policy not the expulsion of the enemy invaders but the suppression of a
group of his countrymen to whose aims he was inexorably opposed, and whom he
regarded as his most serious rivals for power after the collapse of the Germans which
he thought ultimately inevitable.” His view of the Partisans as his principal enemy led
Mihailović to adopt “various measures of collaboration with the Axis which [had]
been a serious factor in causing the Allies to withdraw support” from him.130
In addition to accusing Mihailović of collaboration, the military also concluded
that the Četniks were Pan-Serb. The handbook went on to describe the group of
“political figures” with “violently chauvinistic convictions” who attached themselves
to the Četniks. As a consequence of these political figures’ influence,
the intense Serb nationalism which animated this group caused them to
ascribe the military collapse of Yugoslavia… to Croat treachery and a
myth of “stab in the back” was carefully fostered in a way similar to
that which flourished in similar psychological conditions in post-1918
Germany… To this anti-Croat and Great-Serb trend was allied the
hostility of [Mihailović] and the officer class towards Communism,
coupled with the profession of undying loyalty to the King…. Of the
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violent Great-Serb nature of Mihailović’s early policy and propaganda
there is ample evidence.131
While the handbook acknowledged that Mihailović was able to achieve a degree of
unity across ethnic boundaries by appealing to anti-communist sentiments among
conservative Yugoslavs, it argued that Mihailović’s efforts to overcome the alienation
that resulted from the Četnik’s association with Pan-Serbism proved to be too little,
too late.132
The military’s findings on the Četnik resistance had parallels within the United
States and were preceded by a discourse among American civilians and government
officials about the nature of Mihailović’s movement and what it meant for the future
of Yugoslavia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Krapfl described romance as “a
quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil.”133 Mihailović enjoyed nearly
universal support within the US when Americans understood the Četniks as being
engaged in a generic struggle of good versus evil. In this chapter I discuss how many
liberal cultural producers increasingly came to view the YGE and Mihailović as
reactionary, dictatorial, and Pan-Serb.134 None of these characteristics aligned with
the liberal belief that the war was a “democratic revolution” based upon the principles
131
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of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.135 FDR introduced the Four Freedoms
during his annual message to Congress in 1941. In this message, he explained that his
policies were meant to safeguard what he described as the “four essential human
freedoms.” These consisted of “freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from
want and from fear.”136 The Atlantic Charter was agreed upon by FDR and Churchill
in August 1941. Among the commitments of this agreement was the pledge “that the
postwar order would respect the self-determination of nations.”137 The Four Freedoms
and the Atlantic Charter provided that ideological underpinnings of the US war effort.
As historian Frank A. Warren notes,
From [FDR’s] Four Freedoms speech… to the editorials in PM, The
Nation, The New Republic, Common Sense, and The Free World…
liberal ideology, liberal rhetoric, and liberal assumptions permeated
discussion of war. “Democracy,” “freedom,” the “common man,” the
“people,” and the “people’s revolution” were the words and phrases
which… did things in defining the meaning and purpose of World War
II.138
The divergence of the perceived aims of the Četnik movement from liberal ideals,
combined with the accusation of collaboration, all served to erode the romantic
narrative of Mihailović’s resistance. Those that either contributed to or were
persuaded by this reassessment of Mihailović’s “quest,” both in regard to its ends and
means, called for the US to look elsewhere for a co-protagonist in its war against
fascism.
In this chapter, I also describe the ways in which Pan-Serbism came into
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conflict with the US government’s attempts to promulgate a message of unity. This
message was continually reiterated by both the government and press and fit the mold
of what White termed the comedic narrative. According to him, the comedy results in
a “reconciliation of men with men, of men with their world and society… [and]
seemingly inalterably opposed elements… are revealed to be… harmonizable with one
another, unified, at one with themselves and the others.”139 Mihailović, the YGE, and
the Yugoslav-American community were components of a larger metanarrative of
global unity. This narrative called upon Yugoslav-Americans to unite with one
another and US society as a whole, for the resistance forces in Yugoslavia to fight
together, and for the YGE to overcome its internal political differences. This
metanarrative was given form in the United Nations, which would win the war and
ensure peace, stability, and American security in its aftermath.140 Tito, rather than
Mihailović, came to be seen by many as the likelier candidate to ensure Yugoslavian
unity and postwar peace.
THE PROBLEMS WITH PAN-SERBISM
Throughout the war, Pan-Serb proponents within the Serb-American community
attacked the Croats as a whole and attempted to link Croat-Americans to fascism and
Pavelić’s regime, often while simultaneously advocating for US support of
Mihailović. An example of this can be seen in a letter sent to the State Department by
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the leadership of a Serbian Eastern Orthodox parish in Steelton, Pennsylvania:
We Americans of Serbian descent… direct this protest… against the
so-called “Croatian Congress” which is to be held in Chicago,
Illinois… BECAUSE it is a Congress called by those whose nearest kin
have declared war against the United States… That it might be called
‘Pavelich’s’ Congress can be seen by this, that [its] president… was
[accused of being] a Pro-Nazi.
The letter proceeded to express gratitude for the “aid given to General [Draža
Mihailović] and his Serbian [Četniks], who in fact are keeping open the Second Front
in Europe… [and] pinning down thirty of Hitler’s divisions in the Balkans.”141
Besides being encouraged by the pro-Serb sentiments expressed by members of the
press and government, the Serb-Americans that made such accusations might have
reasonably expected that domestic anxieties about disloyal citizens with foreign ties
had produced an environment that was conducive to the propagation and acceptance of
their message. In their eagerness to exploit America’s wartime nativism, they
apparently failed to appreciate that they wielded a double-edged sword.
Although the United States appeared to be working itself into a nativist lather
over the threat posed by fifth columnists prior to its formal entrance into the war as a
belligerent, these fears would largely be channeled toward combatting foreign
influence and social discord. In 1940, the ubiquitous William Donovan co-authored a
pamphlet, Fifth Column Lessons for America, published by the American Council on
Public Affairs. In it, he made clear that Hitler’s military success would not have been
possible without the help of “Germans abroad and sympathizers in victim
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countries.”142 Unfortunately, the tolerance of democratic societies like the United
States allowed fifth columnists to “function most freely and effectively.”143 This
permissiveness allowed for them to spread divisive propaganda. “Hitler’s final
weapon in this country would be… the creation of revolution” Donovan warned and
quoted Hitler’s plan to “produce unrest and revolts in the United States.”144 Members
of the press also lamented that the US government had been too lenient in allowing
fifth columnists to operate, as can be seen in a Saturday Evening Post editorial from
August 3, 1940, that proposed “in common sense there are only a few words to be said
about the Fifth Column… Every political organization subject to foreign influence
should be outlawed. Any American citizen belonging to one… should be charged
with treason.”145
One factor that likely helped to mitigate nativist backlash toward Croats in the
United States was the memory of the regrettable treatment of German-Americans
during the First World War. As State Department official Harry B. Hoskins wrote in
1942,
most of us will remember the unfortunate experience of World War I,
when there was in many sections of the country an almost automatic
tendency to classify as pro-German all who had German names or were
of German descent. This bigoted assumption led to a kind of witchhunting which did serious damage to our national unity… Yet it is a
matter of record that, with a very small number of exceptions, our
German and other foreign-born citizens during the last war were as
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loyal and useful to the United States as any other citizen group.146
Possibly with this past manifestation of American nativism in mind, some members of
the press rushed to the defense of the Croats even as others vilified them. For
instance, in an April 1941 issue of The New Republic, M. W. Fodor informed his
readers that “we have often read that the Croats are pro-Nazi. Fundamentally this is
not true, since the Croat is just as liberty-loving and jealous of his independence as is
the Serb.”147
Some Croat-Americans defended their Yugoslav kin as the victims of Serbian
misrule. Immediately following the invasion of Yugoslavia, the Chicago Daily
Tribune provided insight into the “Croatian point of view” regarding the establishment
of the NDH in light of the historical treatment of Croats in Yugoslavia. According to
a letter to the editor from a presumably Croat contributor, between “1918 and 1939,”
the Yugoslav government had forced “the Croatians into submission by acts of
brutality and savagery.” Because of these injustices, Pavelić was to be considered no
more of a “terrorist” than was “George Washington.” While the defense of Pavelić
was not a position that met with widespread American sympathy, the argument that
traditional Yugoslav rule was unfair to non-Serbs and needed to be revised would
be.148
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There was also a tendency among liberal cultural producers within the United
States to link racism to Nazism. This can be seen in an article that appeared in the
Autumn 1943 issue of Common Ground, which was co-authored by John Collier, the
US Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and Saul Padover, Assistant to the Secretary of
the Interior. The article explained that Hitler had started a global “race war” with the
result that “everywhere race prejudice is endemic.” The authors expressed their
believe that “race and ‘minority’ questions” had the potential to “wreck our
democracy” if left unresolved. The solution to this threat was overcoming race
“prejudice” and “arrogance” and the “establishment of a genuine equality for all
peoples… [without which] there [could] be no lasting peace in the world.” The ideal
course of action was to be modeled on the Soviet Union, which had “solved its racial
and ethnic problems wisely—by preaching and practicing genuine equality of
opportunity for all its citizens, regardless of their color or racial origin.”149 As will be
seen, Pan-Serbism came to be compared to Nazi race “prejudice” and “arrogance.” In
contrast, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Partisan movement came to be portrayed in
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the same way that Collier and Padover favorably described the Soviet solution to race
problems.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the State Department expressed
concern about not just the foreign influence exerted by the enemies of the United
States, but foreign influence in general. On December 10, 1941, within days of the
government’s designation of Japanese, Italian, and German citizens in the United
States as enemy aliens, the State Department issued a policy statement regarding
political activities of “free movements.”150 The State Department recognized that “the
United States is composed of citizens from many national backgrounds” and allowed
that they might have “a natural interest in their country of origin.” Regardless of such
inclinations, it declared that “United States citizens of whatever background owe, and
have, an undivided allegiance to the United States.” It then went on to state that “the
first concern of the United States must always be the unity of the country,” and that
US government would look with disfavor on “any attempt to enlist the support of
American citizens of like racial background on the theory that they are ‘fellow
nationals.’”151
The threat that discord among Yugoslav-Americans posed to domestic unity was
of serious concern to the US government, and the proponents of Greater Serbia were
quickly identified as the ones who were primarily responsible for inflaming the
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dispute.152 According to a report provided by British intelligence to the Foreign
Nationalities Branch (FNB) of the OSS in December, 1941, “the chief danger to
Yugoslav unity [in the United States]… comes from the Serbian National Federation
[SNF] with its dangerous press and campaign of anti-Croat, non-Yugoslav, pro-Serb
tendency.”153 A State Department report from May 27, 1942 drew similar
conclusions. It found that Amerikanski Srbobran, “the official organ of the Serb
National Federation and the most influential Serb-language daily in the United States,
opened the anti-Croat campaign” in early November. As a part of this campaign, the
paper ran a front-page “account of the suppression of the Serbs… and accused the
Croats as a whole of being [pro-Pavelić]. The indignant reply of the American Croats
was to ask why the [Srbobran] omitted criticism of [Nedić], the Serbian counterpart of
[Pavelić].” The State Department surmised that the purpose of SNF’s attack was to
discredit “the idea of Yugoslavia itself, thus paving the way for a ‘Greater Serbia.’”154
The same report also concluded that some of the most egregious perpetuators of antiCroat hostilities included two individuals linked to the YGE: Archbishop Dionisije
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Milivojević, head of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church in North America, and the
YGE’s chief diplomatic representative in the United States, Minister Constantin
Fotić.155
There were several other domestic factors that contributed to the government’s
particular concern over the ways in which Serb nationalism was being expressed
within America and undermining the narrative of national unity. One of these was the
large numbers of Yugoslav-Americans employed “in heavy industries in the East and
Middle West,” and thus the possibility that discord within this community might
adversely affect war production.156 Another factor was that Americans of Croat and
Slovene descent significantly outnumbered the Serbs. According to a 1944 estimate,
there were a total of one million first, second, and third generation YugoslavAmericans. Of these, approximately 500,000 were Croats, 300,000 were Slovenes,
and 200,000 were Serbs.157 This meant that the majority of Yugoslav-Americans were
understandably hostile to the idea of Greater Serbia and anti-Croat propaganda. This
had potential implications for electoral politics if the majority of Yugoslav-Americans
sensed that government policy favored the Serbs.158 This was of particular concern in
light of reports like the one sent by the COI to the State Department on May 27, 1942,
that the apparent latitude granted to Fotić and Dionsije within the US had led many
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Serbs and Croats to assume “that the movement against a confederated Yugoslavia
and for a Greater Serbia had at least the tacit approval of the United States
Government.”159
The issue of demographics was brought up in a meeting between Assistant
Secretary of State Adolph Berle and Fotić on June 12, 1942, during which Berle tried
to bring Fotić to heel. According to Berle, he expressed to Fotić that the government
was “disturbed by the recrudescence of the Great Serbian Movement in the United
States.” He pointed out to Fotić that the “majority of Yugoslav subjects in the United
States… were not Serbs,” but Croats, and that it was his “distinct impression” that “the
great majority” of them did not support Pavelić. Berle also revealed that he was aware
that Fotić had “interested himself” in the “Serb-Croat controversy” and expressed his
hope that Fotić “would exert his influence” in “reducing” these tensions.160 If he
hoped that this meeting would either alter Fotić’s behavior or quell the Croat-Serb
dispute, Berle was to be sadly disappointed.
In September, 1942, Elmer Davis, the director of the Office of War Information
(OWI), invited Berle to a meeting of the editors of the major Yugoslav foreign
language papers in order to cajole them into assisting with the restoration of harmony
in the Yugoslav-American community. According to Berle’s account of the meeting,
the Serbs were “still making trouble for the Croats—probably with some help from”
Fotić. Berle told the attendees that it would be “a complete perversion of [US] policy”
to view the recent decision to upgrade the status of the Yugoslav legation to that of
embassy “as a personal tribute to the” Pan-Serbs or Fotić. He also made clear that the
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US “had no interest in the politics of General [Mihailović], so long as he was fighting
the Germans… This had nothing whatever to do with his political views or possible
later aspirations.”161 This would not be the only instance in which government
officials distanced themselves from Mihailović’s political objectives.
If FDR had somehow remained unaware of the potential for public backlash in
response to the perception of governmental endorsement of Pan-Serbism, this was
remedied shortly after a speech he delivered on September 3, 1942. During this
address, he made reference to the “fighting spirit” and “unconquerable peoples” of a
number of occupied countries, to include “Serbia.”162 The New York Times reported
on September 12, that the President had been told “some concern had arisen… that he
no longer recognized Yugoslavia.” The incident was explained away as “a slip… due
to the fact that in former days [the President] used to see the name Serbia so much on
the stamps he collected.”163
FDR’s faux pax caused an immediate international and domestic stir. The Vice
Prime Minister of the YGE informed US Minister Biddle about the great esteem in
which the Croats held the United States, their knowledge of what happened there, and
how regretful it was that the President had failed to acknowledge their resistance.164
According to the Washington, D.C. newspaper The Evening Star, Louis Adamic,
“noted American author of Yugoslav birth,” sent a message to the White House,
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informing them
that the President’s saying “Serbia” disposes of Yugoslavia as a state,
and that has caused an uproar among Yugoslavs and YugoslavAmericans, whose number exceed 1,000,000, 90 per cent of whom are
of Croatian and Slovenian origin. The matter involves the morale of
hundreds of thousands of people (Croat-Americans) working in our war
plants.
As evidence of the way in which Serb chauvinists might exploit the slip, the
article recounted that, while speaking at a luncheon, Ruth Mitchell claimed “that the
end of Yugoslavia has been conceded by the highest authorities.” The article went on
to explain the nature of the Pan-Serb ideology and the Croat-Serb dispute. It described
the aim of “the Pan-Serb movement” as the creation of “post-war Serbian domination
over the other nationality groups” in Yugoslavia. It also informed its readers that the
State Department, OWI, and the OSS
have all sought to discourage the men who are active in the attempt to
arrange that Serbs shall be supreme in Yugoslavia over the Croats and
Slovenes after Axis withdrawal. Officially, this is regarded as a denial
of the thesis of the Atlantic Charter, which implies equality of
nationality groups.165
Despite official claims that the United States was uninterested in Mihailović’s
politics, the government kept informed about them throughout the war, and there was
substantial reason to believe that the Četniks were a reactionary force that fought for
the creation of a postwar Greater Serbia. In September, 1942, the British Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS) provided the OSS with an assessment of the situation in
Yugoslavia, to include the political character of Mihailović’s resistance movement.
According to the report, Mihailović was “primarily concerned with Serbia and the
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Serbs.” He also regarded the Partisans as “the most dangerous enemy of his ideal of
‘Srpstvo,’” a term that, according to Adis Maksić, “roughly signifies a quality of being
a Serb, and is often translated as ‘Serbdom’ or ‘Serbianism.’”166 SIS believed that
Mihailović’s overall policy was “to destroy these internal enemies and to build up an
organization that will be in a position to establish an authoritarian Pan-Serb regime
(under King Peter II).”167 An OSS report from November 26, 1942, that was based
upon information provided by “Russian sources” confirmed these findings, noting that
while Mihailović was “non-political,” he had “the reputation of a chauvinist with
‘Great-Serb’ ideals and a distrust, if not hatred, for the Croats.”168 Similar concerns
were reported by Anthony Biddle, the US ambassador to the YGE. In a message to
the Secretary of State in January, 1943, Biddle reported on the belief among the Croat,
Slovene, and Serb-Democrat members of the YGE that Mihailović had been instructed
“to pursue the Pan-Serb line of policy” within Yugoslavia.169
Pan-Serbs were identified as chronic spoilers of unity within the YGE and were
blamed for its failure to adopt of a “liberal forward-looking policy.” Mihailović was
seen as a party to this dispute due to his suspected adherence to Pan-Serbism and
appointment as Minister of War. Biddle actively encouraged the YGE to declare “a
post-war policy envisaging equal economic, social, and political opportunities for all.”
Although such a policy was supported by Serb Democrat, Croat, and Slovene
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members of the YGE, it was opposed by “Serb Extremists.”170 For example, Biddle
reported on December 5, 1942, that while the development of a “forward-looking
policy” was being discussed at a recent YGE cabinet meeting, the Radical Serb Party
member and Minister of Education, Miloš Trifunović, “urged the formation of a
purely Serbian front, limited to Serbs from Serbia.” In response, a Croat member of
the cabinet “emphasized his earnest hopes for the reestablishment of Yugoslavia along
democratic lines: a federated state under the King, wherein all would enjoy equal
rights politically, economically and spiritually.” Biddle noted that the “scheme” to
increase the postwar strength of the Serbs vis-à-vis the Croats by including Bosnia
within Serbia was supported by Mihailović, whose involvement presaged “a vigorous
debate before [the US] may expect this question to be ironed out.”171
On December 20, 1942, Secretary of State Hull wrote to Biddle that he was to
continue his “informal efforts” at “bringing about a better understanding” among the
factions within the YGE. He also made the point that “aspects” of the “Yugoslav
question” were of “direct concern to a considerable element of the American people”
and that Serb-Croat dispute was having “a deplorable effect on” the United States’
“national unity.” Although he recognized that Fotić bore “a considerable degree of”
responsibility for this discord “through his apparent support of the Pan-Serb element,”
he nevertheless thought that it was best that he remain as the YGE’s representative
within the United States. He expressed regret that the Mihailović-Partisan controversy
had “gained some prominence in the American press,” but insisted that the US
government maintained “full confidence” in Mihailović, as “statements about to be
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made” would make clear. In Hull’s opinion, “the most effective” charge against
Mihailović was that he had “lost respect for his own Government’s belief in Yugoslav
unity.”172
MIHAILOVIĆ ACCUSED
If viewed in isolation, the message that Secretary of Hull recommended be sent
by General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Mihailović on the eve of 1943 suggested that the
romantic narrative about the Četnik leader continued unabated.
General Draža Mihailovich… the American forces in Europe and
Africa send greetings to their comrades in arms the resourceful and
gallant Yugoslav military units under your splendid leadership. These
brave men banded together on their native soil to drive the invaders
from their country are serving with full devotion the cause of the
United Nations. May the New Year bring them full success. 173
However, Time drew attention to the fact that the contents of the message were not
released by Eisenhower’s headquarters, but instead by the YGE. This was seen as a
possible sign that the US government did not know “enough about the complexities”
of the Yugoslav conflict “to justify a clean-cut commitment.”174 The YGE released
the message to the press on January 11, 1943. According to The New York Times, “a
spokesman said that the message was definite evidence that the United Nations were
backing General [Mihailović] and threw down various recent attempts to discredit him
and his efforts.”175 Central to these “attempts to discredit” Mihailović was the
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suggestion that one of the ways in which his “gallant” forces had been “resourceful”
was by collaborating with the Axis occupiers.
The initial accusation of Mihailović’s collaboration followed shortly after the
Germans launched their summer offensive against the Red Army on June 28, 1942.176
In anticipation of this offensive, the Soviet foreign minister traveled to London a few
weeks prior in order to encourage the opening of a second front on continental Europe.
Churchill explained that, for the moment, this was impossible.177 The Soviets had
borne the brunt of German hostilities for the past year and it looked as if 1942 would
be no different. On July 28, a communist newspaper in New York, The Daily Worker,
ran an article repeating the claims of Radio Free Yugoslavia that Mihailović was “a
Fascist and a traitor.”178 Radio Free Yugoslavia was based in the Soviet Union and
Walter Roberts argues that it could not broadcast such claims “without the consent of
the Soviet authorities.”179 This marked a sharp break with earlier Soviet policy, when
the Comintern had dismissed Tito’s complaints of Četnik collaboration and
encouraged him “to achieve a true united national front” against the Axis occupiers.180
In light of the failure of the Soviet Union’s Western allies to provide satisfactory
succor, the Soviets most likely decided to encourage fighting where it existed.181

176

Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. 4, August 1942-September 1943 (London: Her Majesty’s
Stationary Office, 1972), 31.
177
Churchill originally suggested that a second front might be opened by August or September at the
earliest. However, on August 12, 1942, he traveled to the Soviet Union to deliver the news in person
that there would be no second front until 1943. Williams, Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans, 84-85.
178
Sumner Welles, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles),” August
5, 1942, FRUS, 1942: Volume III, Europe, 806-808.
179
Roberts, Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 62.
180
Milorad M. Drachkovitch, “The Comintern and the Insurrectional Activity of the Community Party
of Yugoslavia in 1941-1942,” in The Comintern: Historical Highlights, eds. Milorad M. Drachkovitch
and Branko Lazitch (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), 206.
181
Newspaper correspondents surmised as much at the time. According to New York Times reporter
Harold Callender, it was “pointed out in diplomatic quarters that Russian support and propaganda for
the Yugoslav partisans approximately coincided with Russian demands for a second front against

57

In August 1942, Fotić presented Welles with a series of telegrams from
Mihailović in which the general explained his actions in Yugoslavia. According to
Mihailović’s messages, he could not “give a serious blow” without adequate “arms
and supplies.” He also stated that he was instructed by the British to prevent “a
Communist uprising for Soviet Russia,” that “the Communists are hated by the
people,” and that “the people have been provoked by the incredible terror of the
Communists who had killed thousands of Nationalists.”182 This was undoubtedly a
move to counter the accusations in The Daily Worker, which Fotić also addressed. He
complained that “this article had immediately been republished in the [communistinclined] portions of the Croatian press in the United States.”183 Considering the
demonization that the Croats experienced following the invasion of Yugoslavia, it is
not surprising that they seized upon the opportunity to slander the Pan-Serbs’ hero.
While the mainstream press was not initially receptive to the communists’
accusations, its defense of Mihailović grew muddled over a very short period of time.
Through October, 1942, The New York Times dutifully reported the YGE’s “utmost
confidence” in Mihailović and described the Partisans as a group of “criminals,
renegades, bandits, and dissident Croats and Moslems.”184 By November 20, The New
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York Times conceded that although the accusation of “‘traffic’ with the enemy” had
gained “some verisimilitude,” Mihailović’s “defenders” explained that contact with
Italians and Nedić was necessary in order to obtain supplies. In addition, Nedić was
“after all… a Serb and… no Quisling.”185 This was a distinction that few, if any,
within the American government or press had made in the past or would make in the
future. The Nation assured its readers on November 28, 1942, that although the
rebuttals to the accusations made in The Daily Worker revealed that a “considerable
civil war” was underway in Yugoslavia, the “charge that [Mihailović acted] in
calculated collusion with [Nedić], the Serbian Quisling, [was] certainly unfounded.”
Instead, Mihailović and Nedić had “made simultaneous, though wholly separate,
moves against the partisans.”186
The trajectory of American reporting on Mihailović conflicted with the YGE’s
portrayal, which continued to present the Četnik resistance in absolute terms. A
memorandum that the YGE sent to the State Department in December insisted that
Mihailović’s “activities… [had] not ceased for a moment” and that “allegations… that
he [was] indirectly cooperating with the Axis” were false.187 One reason that the YGE
possibly felt compelled to continue presenting Mihailović in this manner is suggested
by Paul Fussell’s observation about wartime categorizations:
If war is a political, social, and psychological disaster, it is also a
perceptual and rhetorical scandal from which total recovery is unlikely.
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Looking out upon the wartime world, soldiers and civilians alike reduce
it to a simplified sketch featuring a limited series of classifications into
which people, in the process dehumanized and deprived of
individuality or eccentricity, are fitted.188
While the British were aware of Mihailović dealings with the Italians, and
distinguished his behavior from “true” collaboration, the YGE was undoubtedly
concerned that neither the American nor Yugoslav public would appreciate this
distinction.189
Moscow was also sensitive to the problem of categorization as it related to Tito’s
Partisans. In a series of messages in early 1942, the Comintern reprimanded Tito for
allowing the Partisans to “acquire a Communist character” and instructed him not to
“view the issues of [his] fight only from [his] own national standpoint, but also from
the international standpoint of the American-British-Soviet coalition” and to
demonstrate “political elasticity.”190 In November, 1942, the Comintern gave Tito
permission to form “a national liberation committee of Yugoslavia… with an allnational Yugoslav and all-party antifascist character” with the caveats that Tito would
refrain from putting “it in opposition to the” YGE or “raise the question” of abolishing
the monarchy. Thus, with Moscow’s blessing, Tito formed the Anti-Fascist Council
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of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Bihać in November 1942.191
This would subsequently be hailed by many as evidence of the Partisans’ democratic
character.
Possibly spurred to a higher standard of journalistic integrity by the British
decision to begin mentioning the Partisans in its propaganda broadcasts, the December
14, 1942, issue of Time magazine declared that Mihailović had been “eclipsed” by the
Partisans.192 According to the article, Americans had been so “misled by previous
reports” about Mihailović that “many a Time reader nominated [Mihailović] for Man
of the Year.” Time revealed that, in fact, the Četniks had been militarily inactive, and
that those who wanted “to continue active resistance” had deserted to the Partisans.
The “impoverished peasants” of all nationalities within Yugoslavia showed “an
increasing preference for the Partisans” over Mihailović, who fought “for a greater
Serbia.” In contrast to Mihailović, the Partisans had adopted “democratic methods
almost unprecedented in the Balkans.” Proof that the Partisans were neither
“Communist” nor “bandit” could be seen in the political heterogeneity and
respectability of the “National Constitutional Assembly” that had been formed in the
Partisan “capital” of Bihać.193
Within days of the Time’s article, The Saturday Evening Post ran Adamic’s
“Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man,” which was also critical of Mihailović and the
Četniks. According to Adamic, Mihailović’s “dilemma” was whether to choose to be
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on the side of “democracy" and “revolutionary Communism” or on the side of
“Fascism.” Unfortunately, “orders from the” YGE led Mihailović “necessarily closer
to the Quisling apparatus” than to the Partisans. While Adamic allowed that “some
people” in Yugoslavia were “anti-Partisan,” he claimed that the “majority” were not.
However, he did express some apprehension about the Partisan’s revolutionary nature,
reminding his readers of “the death of hundreds of thousands of people” as a result of
Communist revolution in China.194 He closed by asking what the situation in
Yugoslavia meant for the fate of democracy.195 As the Partisan-Četnik struggle
continued, Adamic and other liberal and left-leaning writers would direct increasingly
harsh criticism toward Mihailović and be far more reserved in bringing scrutiny to
bear on the Partisans. Rather than signaling a complete narrative volte-face, these
criticisms instead meant that the romantic narrative of Mihailović was now contested,
and that reporting on Yugoslavia would no longer consist solely of hagiographical
about Mihailović.
Perhaps none of Mihailović’s American supporters refused to go gentle into that
good night more so than reporter Ruth Mitchell. Besides being the sister of General
Billy Mitchell, she gained a measure of fame in her own right by joining the Četniks
while on assignment in the Balkans. She then promptly fell into the hands of the
Gestapo. After a year in prison, Mitchell was released by the Germans and returned to
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the United States, where she advocated tirelessly on behalf of the Četniks.196
Mitchell’s refutation of the accusations against Mihailović served as a precursor
to the early historiographical focus on communist conspiracy as discussed in the
introduction. As Krapfl notes, “romance can attribute failure only to a diabolical
antagonist.”197 In the case of Mihailović, his diabolical antagonists were the
communists, as Mitchell made clear in “General Mihailovich: The Story of a FrameUp,” in the July, 1943 issue of The American Mercury. In it, Mitchell traced the
accusations of collaboration to the communist publications The Daily Worker and New
Masses, from where their “echoes” filtered into the mainstream press. Of the
“communists and their collaborators” that were running “wild… in inflating the
performance of the ‘Partisans’ and in smearing” Mihailović, Ruth singled out the
influence of Louis Adamic as particularly pernicious. According to Mitchell, Adamic
wielded undue influence upon the OWI, spread “communist propaganda,” and was
“widely regarded as a Serb hater.”198 For his part, Adamic accused Mitchell of being
on the payroll of the YGE.199
Mitchell was right to be concerned that the “vilification” of Mihailović had led
many “to doubt and to wonder,” as one of those that had started to doubt was
Ambassador Biddle.200 Initially, Biddle appeared to give little attention to the
accusations of collaboration. He instead focused on resolving the disputes within the
YGE and the Yugoslav-American community and persuading the Yugoslav
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government to pressure Mihailović into brokering a truce with the Partisans. As he
told the Yugoslav Prime Minister in January, “the most important point to stress,”
both for the YGE and its embassy in the US, “was the establishment of unity.” This
“unity amongst the Yugoslavs both at home and abroad” would also “overcome the
opposition of the so-called Communist press.”201 However, in April, 1943, Biddle
reported his assessment of Mihailović’s denials of collaboration. He noted that
Mihailović denied the “allegations in the first person,” which Biddle suspected was
done in the naive hope of sweeping “aside the question of cooperation by
[Mihailović’s] ‘lieutenants.’”202
A letter drafted by Elmer Davis in June 1943 to be sent to the president of the
SNF indicated that his previous meeting with the foreign-language newspaper editors
did not succeed in persuading Amerikanski Srbobran’s to adopt a more harmonious
tone. It also demonstrated that members of the State Department were not the only
government officials who were frustrated by the ways in which Pan-Serb activism was
undermining unity. Davis wrote,
for some time, several branches of the United States Government ,
including the Office of War Information, the Department of Justice,
and the Department of State, have watched with concern the policies of
the “American Srbobran.” Its violent attacks upon all peoples of
Croatian extraction, its strong anti-Catholic articles, and its veiled
efforts to defend the Quisling [Nedić] who supports the Nazi regime in
Serbia often have the effect of aiding the Nazi campaign of intolerance
and race hate… The United Nations are striving for the strongest
possible unity of all those who are opposed to the Axis. In Yugoslavia,
and in the United States, we seek to unite all people of Serbian,
Croatian, and Slovenian heritage who believe in freedom and
democracy….203
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Notably, Davis drew a link between the anti-Croat propaganda of the Pan-Serb
movement and Nazi “race hate,” an obsession that even drove the Srbobran to support
a “Quisling.”
Elements of the mainstream press also took increasing notice, and expressed a
dim view, of the Pan-Serb ideology and the émigré agitators that championed it. For
example, in January 1943, an article in Harper’s explained that
upon the outbreak of the war… the [SNF] organized the Serbian
National Defense Committee. Highly Serbian-nationalistic, the
Committee now spreads across the United States an inflammatory
propaganda not against the obvious enemies of Yugoslavia—the
Germans and Italians—but against the Croatians, the Catholic partners
of the Orthodox Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and against the
Croat-Americans. The committeemen preach that Yugoslavia,
established as a federation of three peoples, is dead, and that the Serbs
are destined to become a Balkan [Herrenvolk], supreme and lordly over
the Croats, who have 800,000 cousins in the United States, and the
Slovenes, who have 250,000.204
The description of the Serb nationalists’ belief that they were “destined to become a
Balkan [Herrenvolk]” blatantly compared the pursuit of Greater Serbia to Nazi race
theory. The article blamed many of the same culprits for perpetuating the Serb-Croat
dispute as had the State Department, including Amerikanski Srbobran and
Ambassador Fotić. As a result of their agitations, “there raged a Balkan-minority war
of words, emphasized furiously now and then by a monkey wrench flung at a Croat
factory worker by a Serb on the same arsenal-of-democracy assembly line.”205 This
suggested that the heroic image of the fighting Serb was under revision now that it was
exhibiting itself on US soil. Although the article took pains to specifically
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disassociate Mihailović from Serb chauvinism, noting that “Croat guerrillas” fought
under his command, the views it expressed did not bode well for his popularity should
such a connection gain credence.206 The article also expressed frustration over the
“elements in the American government that encourage the most reactionary of the
émigrés” despite the fact that the governments-in-exile knew “that changes [were]
coming.”207 It did not comment on the fact that these same émigrés were also
Mihailović’s most vigorous defenders.
There was the potential for significant public backlash over the perception that
the government was colluding with reactionary and collaborationist elements of
occupied countries. This was demonstrated after the ceasefire that Eisenhower and
State Department advisor Robert Murphy negotiated with the Vichy Admiral and
Vice-Premier Jean François Darlan in North Africa. As historian John Lewis Gaddis
remarks, “Despite its justification on military grounds, this arrangement with a
notorious collaborator provoked violent criticism in the United States and Great
Britain."208
An article in The New York Times indicated that the government was sensitive to
the accusation that its policy was “based upon ‘settled reactionary sentiments.’” In
addition to the deal with Darlan, US support of Mihailović was cited as evidence for
the existence of such sentiments. “Out of fear” that these accusations might “cause
serious harm to united action both in this country and elsewhere,” Under Secretary of
State Welles responded to these charges by clarifying that although the “first”
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objective of the war was “absolute victory… secondly” the United States had to “work
to establish a just and lasting peace.” A critical component of this peace was for
people to “choose freely the form of government they desire.” In accordance with this
aim, Welles insisted that while the US might support Mihailović, this was not a result
of “favoritism.” Rather, the US would “aid, to the full extents of [its] ability, any
group which is fighting the common enemy. But that aid [would] not be in such form
as to prejudice a people’s basic right, stated in the Atlantic Charter, to choose its own
form of government.”209
By July, 1943, The Nation no longer defended Mihailović against the charge of
collaboration. Instead, it described how Mihailović had “accepted the view of the
partisans claimed by the Germans, Italians, [Ustaše], and separatist propaganda
bureaus,” which led him to join with the Italians in attacking the Partisans. This meant
that “not only had Croat” Ustaše killed “Serbs… but Serbian [Četniks] killed antifascist Serbs and Croats.” This directly challenged the Manichaean dualism of the
romantic narrative by calling into question the righteousness of the Četnik cause both
in regard to Mihailović’s aims and methods, which no longer stood in stark contrast to
those of the Axis. As the article went on to state,
the propaganda of Hitler and Mussolini, given impetus by [Dimitrije
Ljotić], ideological leader of Serbian orthodox fascism, succeeded in
convincing [Mihailović] and his political advisers that in the struggle
between fascism and communism Serbia and its people must fight the
Communist menace.210
The adherents of Pan-Serbism within the YGE eventually came to be seen as a
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threat to Yugoslavia’s existence as nation. In August, 1943, R. W. Seton-Watson, a
Scottish historian who was instrumental in guiding the creation of Yugoslavia,
provided Ambassador Biddle with a memorandum on the British assessment of the
YGE’s composition. According to the memorandum, the cabinet was “reactionary,
[Pan-Serb], anti-Croat, anti-constitutional, and anti-Russian” and had “no backing
anywhere.” Mihailović’s retention as Minister of War served as “an open refus to the
Partisans and Moscow,” and Seton-Watson suspected that Yugoslavs’ perception of
the YGE would lead the “great majority of patriots away from” Mihailović. This
situation threatened the very “survival of [Yugoslavia] itself.” Seton-Watson also
admonished that “the Serb and Croat public” could “be excused for assuming that” the
United and Britain tacitly approved of the YGE’s “reactionary tendencies.”211
In October 1943, shortly before the pivotal Tehran Conference where the decision
would be made to switch full Allied support to Tito, Donovan provided FDR with a
memorandum “on the Balkan situation” that, besides criticizing Mihailović’s “relative
lack of [military] activity,” also stated that
the Government-in-Exile anticipates that [Mihailović], with assistance
from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet
and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. This is stated in confidence by
General [Petar Živković], Deputy of the King as Commander in Chief,
and by Prime Minister [Božidar Purić]. The Government is not
representative of the population, and causes controversy between
factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are
irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-inExile… these people are also firmly against General [Živković], who,
under King Alexander, was Dictator.212
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As this memorandum suggests, Mihailović, the King, and the YGE were haunted
by the specter of Yugoslavia’s dictatorial past under the rule of King Peter’s father,
and the accusation of authoritarian ambitions was often leveled by the regime’s
detractors. An example of this can be seen in the November 1, 1943 issue of The New
Republic, in which Heinz Eulau launched a blistering attack upon the YGE and
Mihailović. According to Eulau, for “three years [the YGE’s] clever publicity agents,
with the aid of gullible English and American newspapermen, succeeded in attributing
the exploits of” Tito to Mihailović. While it paid “lip-service to democratic ideals,”
the YGE actually continued to pursue “the reactionary, undemocratic, and Serbiannationalist program” directed by the same group that “dominated Yugoslav politics
ever since King Alexander established a dictatorship.” Mihailović refrained from
fighting so that he might “preserve his forces” and make Yugoslavia “a safe place for
the exiled ruling clique to return.”213 Adamic did his part to undermine the YGE
along similar lines in The Bulletin of the United Committee of South-Slavic
Americans. In its first issue, Adamic provided a breakdown of the positions held by
the YGE’s constituent members. He listed Mihailović as the Minister of War and
“perhaps chief candidate for the future military dictator.”214
Amidst the concerns about Mihailović that were being raised within the press and
among government officials, Roosevelt received a highly flattering report about the
Partisans based upon the observations of OSS operative Major Linn Farish.
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According to this report, which Roosevelt subsequently shared with Stalin at the
Tehran Conference, “the Partisan movement [was] of far greater military and political
importance than [was] commonly realized.”215 The Partisans had “created… a free
community” consisting of Muslims, “Christians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Communist
Party members,” all of whom were allowed to practice “any religion or political
belief” and freely “express” their opinions.216 Mihailović and the other Četnik leaders,
on the other hand, were “more concerned with their plans for themselves after the
war… and thus commenced the bitter civil war which [had] become so savage” that
Farish found it hard “to see how a reasonable understanding [could] be brought
about.”217 While the British had once defended Allied support of Mihailović based
upon the belief that his organization offered the “best prospect of preventing chaos
after the war,” Farish’s report accused Mihailović of actually being the cause of this
feared chaos.218
FDR would not receive the report of Captain Walter Mansfield, a US Marine and
OSS liaison with the Četniks, until April 7, 1944, but Farish’s counterpart did not
offer a ringing endorsement of the unifying potential of the Četnik movement. His
report confirmed that, while some Četnik officers “believed there should be a
federation of independent states… under King Peter,” others wanted “a greater Serbia
which will be the predominating influence in all” of Yugoslavia, and most favored at
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least an “independent Serbia.”219
Reporting in much of the American press mirrored Farish’s positive assessment
of the Partisans. According to an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune from October
26, 1943, while the Partisans claimed to represent all of the Yugoslav “national
groups,” the Četniks were “predominantly Serbian” and appeared “to be anti-Croat
because of alleged Croatian treachery during” the Yugoslav-Axis conflict.220 In
December, 1943, Life informed its readers that the Partisans represented “a kind of
New Deal for Yugoslavia.”221 And although a later article in Life allowed that Tito
was a communist, it quoted the remarks of “a British observer” that Tito was “a most
uncommunistic Communist.” Examples of his “uncommunistic” behavior included
the ways in which Tito protected “religion and private property.” The article also
emphasized the inclusivity of the Partisans, noting that there were “bearded Serbian
priests” among their ranks, and that “a whole row of respectable conservatives” were
to be found within AVNOJ.222
An article titled “Balkan Time Bomb,” in the January 22, 1944 issue of Collier’s
Weekly demonstrated the substantial revision that the perceptions of Mihailović and
the Serbs had undergone over the course of 1943. The article claimed that it was
“wrong to consider all [Četniks] as great patriots” and even “less accurate to identify
[Mihailović] as a [Četnik], for he [was] eminently unproletarian and definitely from
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the top drawer of Serbian society.”223 While Mihailović “splattered” his
proclamations with “assertions of his loyalty to ‘democracy,’” the article suggested
that his “personal background” provided the “best clues” to his politics, and stated that
first of all, he’s a Serb, and the Serbs have always thought themselves
the chosen people of the Balkans. They modestly admit that what Lord
Gladstone once said of them is true. He described the Serbs as “a
select, a noble and imperial race,” and the story of Serbia is a story of a
vital, bellicose minority which tried for decades to impose its will—and
its king—on its neighbors.
Under the subheading of “Feudalism in our Times,” the article described Yugoslavia’s
“peasant population” as so benighted and poverty-stricken that “when foreign relief
agencies” provided them with “cocoa, they didn’t know what it was” and used it to
paint “their huts.” It ended by warning that although Yugoslavia was “remote,” if its
problems remained unresolved, the reader “might just as well start getting ready for
another war.”224 The article left little doubt as to the likelihood that Mihailović was
the solution to Yugoslavia’s problems.
After the withdrawal of the military mission to Mihailović, Roosevelt sent King
Peter a message in May, 1944, in which he insisted that the “sentiments” of the United
States had “not changed,” and that it remained “pledged to the liberation of
Yugoslavia and… [hoped] again to see the union of its national elements under
common government, democratic in form and fact, as the purposes for which” World
War II was “being fought” required. However, he noted that
it is one of the misfortunes of the war that your country, battered and
dismembered by the enemy, has suffered also from internal conflicts,
which in turn have revived older antagonisms… You speak of the
Government’s popularity with the people at home. I wish I could say
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that our reports from within Yugoslavia confirm this. On the contrary,
they indicate that the people in Yugoslavia have sought, and still are
seeking, a leadership which would have vision for dealing with the new
social forces at work in the world today…. Let us not forget that the
[Mihailović] question has become more political than military.
FDR went on to suggest the Mihailović, although he was a “fine soldier,” be
relieved of his ministerial post. He also chided the King that “the Partisan
movement is stronger, and has far greater popular support, and sympathy for it
extends into larger areas, than your Government has been willing to
acknowledge… Any fundamental approach to a solution of the unhappy civil
strife in Yugoslavia must take this reality into account.”225
CONCLUSION
While the romantic narrative of Mihailović never completely collapsed, it was
sufficiently called into question to allow for the consideration of Tito as a viable
alternative for US support. This rhetorical space, which allowed for the redirection of
US policy, was in part created by casting doubt upon Mihailović’s politics. The fact
that government officials assiduously avoided aligning themselves politically with
Mihailović demonstrates the degree of this doubt. Their avoidance was an ominous
sign for the perpetuation of the romantic narrative, because it signaled that the United
States and Mihailović were in pursuit of different postwar ends. The US government
insisted that these ends had to be subordinated to the primary aim of defeating the
Axis. However, in this regard too, the romantic narrative was undermined by
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accusations that, as opposed to fighting the Axis, Mihailović had aligned himself with
them in his fight against communism. Considering the parallels that some Americans
drew between the Pan-Serb ideology and Nazism, these accusations likely seemed
plausible to those that believed that this was an accurate comparison.
Although historian Susan Brewer argues that Americans fought World War II
“for survival, not ideals,” the concepts of security and ideals were not mutually
exclusive as they related to American policy toward Yugoslavia.226 American
awareness of the civil war in Yugoslavia coincided with increasing contemplation of
the postwar future. The liberal solution to the Yugoslav threat to postwar peace was a
democratic Yugoslav government that was representative of its constituent
nationalities. Tito’s movement seemed to promise the realization of this desired end
state. Also, the emerging romantic narrative of Tito did not conflict with the US
narrative of unity to the same degree as did the narrative of Mihailović. Tito’s
movement appeared to have wide ethnic and ideological appeal, both within
Yugoslavia and the United States. In contrast, the tenets of Pan-Serbism had alienated
not only the majority of Yugoslav-Americans, but also liberals within the press and
government. The romantic narrative of Tito complemented the US narrative of unity.
These narratives combined to create the space in which the reformulation of policy
might be considered. While FDR never appeared to completely jettison his pro-Serb
sympathies, the narrative shift constricted his options, as continued support of
Mihailović would have been seen by many as a repudiation of American ideals.
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CHAPTER 3

THE SATIRICAL AND TRAGIC INTERPRETATIONS OF OCCUPIED
YUGOSLAVIA

On July 8, 1944, William Donovan provided FDR with another report from OSS
operative Linn Farish, the tone of which was markedly different than the one received
by the President as he was en route to the Tehran Conference. Farish began his report
by praising the OSS officers that had been assigned to both Tito and Mihailović,
noting that they had all performed admirably within the “perplexing whirl of external
and internal politics.” Farish had come to see that the “deep rooted causes of the
internecine strife” in Yugoslavia were a result of “racial, religious, and political”
disputations of “such long standing that the people themselves [did] not understand
them.” Both the Partisans and the Četniks viewed the other as the other as their
foremost enemy, and Farish believed that “both sides [were] speaking the truth” in that
“they [were] their own worst enemies.” However, the “vast majority” of Yugoslavs
were “neither Right, Left, Communist, Reactionary,” but instead were a “simple
peasant type of people, strong willed, hot blooded, with tremendous powers of
endurance and great personal courage,” who loved “intrigue,” and were “the most
profound liars” that Farish had “ever met.”
Farish's report made it apparent that he believed that the US was, at least in part,
responsible for the “terrible story of misguidance, of rape and death and destruction”
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in Yugoslavia, for there was only “one great power” that Farish felt “might have
prevented… or stopped it,” and this had “never been used.” He explained that
the United States of America is mentioned in the same breath with God
in [Yugoslavia]. We were the one nation on earth to whom the people
believed they could turn for unbiased, unpolitical aid and advice
without having to pay something in return. I am speaking now of the
common man, not Marshal Tito or General [Mihailović]…. It would be
difficult to express the utter helplessness and frustration which we felt
in the face of such complete faith in the ability of our country to right
the wrongs which were so evident on all sides…. They saw in us… the
representatives of a powerful democratic nation in which people of all
racial extraction, religions, and political beliefs live side by side in
harmony, free to speak openly…. In comparison to their own pitiful
condition… it is not hard to realize why [the United States]… has taken
on a more rosy hue than it perhaps deserves…. How long can a great
nation continue not to pay attention to the obligations contained in such
trust and respect? How long can a great nation continue in this manner
and still remain great?
Whereas he had worried “at one time” that the United States was not receiving “proper
recognition for her participation in supply operations,” Farish now questioned the
wisdom of wanting such recognition. This change in attitude was brought about by
seeing “simple peasant boys” with “bullet holes in them… that resulted from
American ammunition, fired from American rifles, dropped from American aircraft
flown by American pilots.” Because of this, he no longer felt that he could “go on
with the work in [Yugoslavia] unless… [an] honest effort… [was] made to put an end
to the civil strife.”227
Among the modes of emplotment, Farish’s impassioned exhortations fall within
the category of tragedy. The tragedy, as described by Krapfl, “is prompted by failure
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to achieve transcendence [and asks] what flaw of the protagonist’s may have
contributed to his fall.228 According to Frye, one interpretation of the tragedy is that is
results from “a violation of moral [emphasis in original] law.”229 The romantic
narrative of Yugoslav resistance was a call for the US to aid the Yugoslav resistance
and thus become a co-protagonist in the Yugoslav quest for freedom from Axis
occupation and the establishment of a just postwar order. The tragic interpretation of
US involvement in Yugoslavia claimed that the US had failed to assume this role by
betraying its ideals and commitments. The tragic narrative called for a return to
American ideals and for the US to take an active and constructive role in Yugoslavia.
As I show in this chapter, the tragic narrative was ultimately unable to overcome the
governmental inertia caused by the satirical interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict.
According to Krapfl, the satirical narrative, which is the “militant form of ironic
employment” allows “virtually no freedom to the hero, and seeks explanations… only
in social structures.”230 Rather than serving as a call to action, the satirical narrative
portrays “human agency” as “an illusion,” making “political action… pointless.”231
“The archetypal theme of irony and satire,” Frye states, is “Sparagmos, or the sense
that heroism and effective action are absent, disorganized, and foredoomed to defeat
and that confusion and anarchy reign over the world.” Notably, Frye defines
“sparagmos” as “tearing to pieces.”232 Crucial to the rise of the satirical narrative was
the reevaluation of the primitive, violent, and volatile nature of the Balkans. Rather
than portraying these characteristics in a positive light, as was the case with the early
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romantic narrative, the satirical narrative emphasized the view of the Balkans that
gave rise to the term “balkanization.” This should perhaps not be surprising
considering the similarities between the concepts of balkanization and sparagmos.
The tragic interpretation of American involvement in Yugoslavia was introduced
almost immediately after the German invasion. However, it failed to gain prominence
within either the press or government circles. In May 1941, Bess Demaree wrote an
article for the The Saturday Evening Post that was highly critical of US
encouragement of the coup. As she put it, “the Americans” were “chiefly responsible
for the setting off” of the “explosion which blew apart” Yugoslavia. In doing so, “the
Americans… accomplished everything which they set out to do…. They persuaded the
fiery Serbs to defy the Germans and thus invite martyrdom on their country.” Even
though the US knew “that thousands of [Yugoslavia’s] people” would be
“slaughtered,” they put this “out of their minds” in pursuit of their “war politics.”233
The United States took advantage of the “almost mystical faith” that Serbs
“possessed” regarding the “the power and the benevolence of the American people,”
knowing full well that “thousands of sea miles separated [it] from the Balkans” and
that the US had neither sufficient supplies nor ships to aid the Yugoslavs in the battle
that was inevitably to come.234 Demaree concluded that, even though the US had not
yet entered the war as a belligerent, the only way to “rescue” Yugoslavia would be
through the use of “American soldiers.”235 While this was certainly a call to action, it
went unheeded. “American soldiers” would primarily be introduced into Yugoslavia
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in the form of downed airmen supplemented by a limited number of OSS operatives
and other military personnel.
The YGE and Mihailović were willing to blame the interference of outside
powers for Yugoslavia’s troubles, but mostly kept their fingers pointed away from the
United States and toward the Soviet Union and Great Britain. As the Ambassador to
the Soviet Union commented in a message to the Secretary of State on October 1,
1942, “the Soviet press” had stopped mentioning Mihailović and referenced “the
activities of only the Partisans.” Based off of conversations with the Yugoslav
Minister, it was surmised that the Soviet support of the Partisans stemmed from the
desire to ensure “that on the conclusion of the war Communists or persons
sympathetic to communism [would] have dominating positions in Yugoslavia.”236
That the British were not above reproach was made clear in a speech that Mihailović
ill-advisedly made in front of the head SOE liaison with Četniks. In it, he accused the
British of pursuing “their own strategic purposes” and of attempting to “purchase Serb
blood at the cost of a trivial supply of munitions.” He could now see “that the Serbs
were… completely friendless” and that the aim of “the western democracies… was to
win the war at the expense of others.”237
The press also noted the problem of outside interference in Yugoslavia and called
for the US to take a more constructive role in forming a Balkan policy with its Allies.
As The New Leader stated in an article titled “The Balkan Powder Keg,” the US could
“adopt the policy of an ostrich and pretend there was no difference between the
Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet Union” and ignore the fact that Stalin had “long
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been making preparations for domination of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.” The
article predicted that “the Balkan tragedy [was] about to unfold itself in all its horror”
in a battle between the West and the Soviet Union for “political domination.” It
warned that “only those who [foresaw] the future [were] destined to govern.”238
However, the United States had no desire to involve itself in such a contest.
The title of an article in The Progressive ominously asked “How Can We Avoid
World War III?” and suggested that the spark for such a conflict was most likely to be
found in Yugoslavia. According to the article, US was making “less and less visible
effort to implement” the principles of “the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter.”
This was a result of the United States’ focus upon “physical involvement in the war”
without thinking “about the world after the war.” This had led to a failure to reach “an
understanding with the Soviet Union” about Yugoslavia. The cause of this cataclysm
was to be the simultaneous invasion of the Balkans by all three of the Great Powers.239
This joint invasion never materialized in large part because of the American reluctance
to do so.
FDR initially seemed amenable to an invasion of the Balkans. As late as the
Tehran conference he suggested that an Anglo-American force might cross “the
Adriatic, for a drive, aided by Tito’s Partisans, northeastward into Rumania to effect a
junction with the Red Army.”240 However, his interest in this strategy waned over
time. This can be seen in a message that the President sent to the Acting Secretary of
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State on February 21, 1944 in which he stated that he thought “it would be a great
mistake for [the US] to participate in a military campaign against the Balkans at [that]
time” and asked him to “take this up with the War Department.”241 Historian Andrew
Buchanan cites FDR’s suggestion of a Balkan campaign in his argument that the US
did not suffer from “Balkan-phobia.”242 In making such an argument, he set himself
against historians such as Barbara Jelavich who argue that “the failure to formulate
and carry through a clear and coherent policy in Eastern Europe… reflected the
general lack of concern over the area among” Americans.243 Both of these
assessments are true. The United States did not originally suffer from “Balkanphobia.” However, the image of the Balkans was subject to change, and government
officials acquired this ailment over time. This in turn gave rise to the incoherency of
US policy on the Balkans and the appearance that they did not care about the region.
This aversion to becoming entangled in the Balkans demonstrates the power of the
satirical narrative.
Reporting within the American press increasingly portrayed Yugoslav internal
turmoil as an interminable and inherent feature of the Balkans and contributed to the
spread of the satirical narrative. The New York Times explained that “the growing
strife” in Yugoslavia was “a new expression of an ancient conflict that has long torn
the Balkan peoples; parts of Yugoslavia are looking… toward Rome and the West,
part toward Byzantium and the East.” While it acknowledged the certain individuals
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were guilty of fanning the flames of the conflict in their pursuit of postwar power,
there nonetheless existed “great frictions” along “lines of natural cleavage” that were
“racial, religious, and ideological.” The article concluded that “more than any other
country in Europe, Yugoslavia poses the terrible nature of the reconstruction problems
that the world will face after the war.”244 Commonweal referred to “the anarchy that
reigns in [Yugoslavia’s] primitive mountain regions,” and noted that even “in the face
of an enemy as powerful and as hated as the” Nazis, the Partisans and Četniks
nevertheless “engaged in bloody internecine strife.” However, this was perhaps to be
expected, considering that “even… between the two big wars there was intermittent
fighting between fierce armed bands.” The article suggested that although “the Big
Powers have fished these troubled waters” in the past, there were now “more urgent
problems for the peace than completely stamping out so chronic a flair for violence
and disorder.”245
One significant aspect of the satirical narrative was its portrayal of the Yugoslav
conflict as an ancient religious dispute. For instance, a previously mentioned State
Department report on disunity within the Yugoslav-American community identified
the contributions made by the clergy of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches to the
Serb-Croat dispute, which it described as the manifestation of a “thousand-year old
animosity.”246 Even Farish, although undoubtedly unintentionally, lent credence to
this interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict with his above-mentioned reference to the
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“racial, religious, and political” disputations of “such long standing that the people
themselves [did] not understand them.”247 As historian Ivo Banac argues, “because
South Slavic cultural diversity is really religiously based, there have been numerous
attempts to link the country’s divisions to religious intolerance.” He points out that
World War II was one such instance of this. Even though “some of the massacres”
that were committed over the course of the war "became religiously based, [these]
occurred in the context of occupation… not of a [religious] or even civil war,” a
term that Banac believes is “much misused.”248 While it is arguably reasonable, if not
unavoidable, to portray the violent struggle between collaborators and resistance
forces as a form of civil war, this verbiage redirects the focus upon such a conflict’s
causes.
Banac brings up a valid criticism of the use of the term “civil war,” in that this
term emphasized the Yugoslav contributions to conflict as opposed to the significant
destabilizing effect of outside interference, to include the activities engaged in by the
United States. As previously discussed, these activities included the initial
encouragement of the coup, which ultimately led to the invasion and occupation of
Yugoslavia and set the conditions for the violent internal political struggle that
followed. The US further destabilized Yugoslavia by supplying both sides of the
Partisan-Četnik conflict. Although the US eventually ceased aid to Mihailović, it
continued to supply Tito indirectly. In a message to FDR in September 1944,
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Donovan reported that the US had “made clear” to Tito and Mihailović that it would
“not support either side in internal political strife.” However, he then reported that
approximately “two thousand tons” of supplies, to include “military arms and
equipment,” were being delivered to the Partisans monthly. Although the British
acted as an intermediary, many of the supplies were of American origin. In summary
he assured the President that the OSS had been “punctilious in keeping out of any…
political controversy” and avoided “any entanglement in rivalry between [Mihailović]
and Tito.”249 This claim seems a bit farcical considering the use to which Tito was
putting the equipment that he was receiving from the West.
The United States also contributed to the Yugoslav conflict by encouraging
violent retribution for collaboration. For example, one American military liaison
reported that he had succeeded in May 1944 in convincing a Partisan commander to
agree “to issue an order stating that any peasant turning [US airmen] over to the
Germans would be shot.”250 While this may seem to have been a reasonable request
based upon military imperatives, one is left to wonder what standards of evidence
were used in determining guilt and meting out justice as a result of this order.
Ostensibly the US mantra of not becoming politically involved in Yugoslavia
stemmed from the United States’ commitment to the Atlantic Charter and the right of
people to choose their own form of government. This can be seen in memorandum
from the State Department to the President on December 23, 1944, about British
attempts to enlist the aid of the United States in convincing the King and Tito to agree
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on the particulars of forming a new Yugoslav government. The memorandum stated
that “it was the hope of” the US government “that genuine efforts [would] be made to
assemble representatives with sound claim to speak for the broad masses… without
other influence” in their project of “governmental reform.” However, the
memorandum went on to make clear that the true reason that the State Department
wanted to avoid “the exercise of its influence” was that this “would involve
responsibilities” that it “considered it should not take in the circumstances, as… the
future of Yugoslavia may be so vitally affected.”251 The satirical view of
Yugoslavia’s future undoubtedly contributed to this noncommittal stance.
The British grew increasingly frustrated with the United States’ non-policy. On
January 16, 1945, the Secretary of State was informed that the British were “preparing
to ‘throw over’ King Peter.” It also stated that the British Ambassador “had been
instructed to tell” the State Department that while “it was all very well and good for
the United States to stall on [the] Yugoslav situation… [the British] could not afford to
take [the] same ‘waffling’ line.”252
FDR needed little convincing about the questionable viability of Yugoslavia as a
country. As will be recalled, he asked Fotić how the Serbs “could expect to live in the
future in the same state with the Croats” in late 1941.253 While Fotić’s reliability
might be questioned in regard to this subject, as his account seemed to favor the PanSerb view, other sources confirm that the President believed this. According to Robert
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E. Sherwood, while dining with presidential advisor Harry Hopkins and the British
Foreign in March 1943, FDR “expressed his [oft-repeated] opinion that Croats and
Serbs had nothing in common and that it [was] ridiculous to try to force two such
antagonistic peoples to live together under one government.” Instead, Roosevelt
“thought that Serbia, itself, should be established by itself and the Croats put under a
trusteeship.” Eden “thought the President’s opinion… a little pessimistic” and
believed that a united postwar Yugoslavia was possible.254 Further evidence is found
in a message from FDR to Churchill on May 18, 1944, in which the President asked
the Prime Minister if he recalled FDR telling him “over a year ago about [FDR’s] talk
with Peter, in which [FDR] discussed the possibility of three nations in place of the
one, [King Peter] to be the head of a reconstituted Serbia.” According to Roosevelt,
“The King, with real fire in his eyes, remarked that he was a Serb.” The President
thought that he and Churchill “should bear some such possibility in mind in case the
new government does not work out.” Even though FDR favored “a Yugoslavia,” he
believed that “three separate states with separate governments in a Balkan
confederation might solve many problems.”255
CONCLUSION
The tragic narrative of Yugoslavia called for policy changes that would relieve
the suffering of the Yugoslav people. Whereas the tragic narrative portrayed British
and Russian influence as baleful, the United States was more often imagined as being
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above the political fray. However, the United States’ efforts to remain politically
disinterested began to give the appearance that the US government was in fact
politically uninterested in Yugoslav affairs. This apparent lack of interest resulted, at
least in part, from the dominance of the satirical narrative. Viewing the Yugoslav
conflict as satire was facilitated by Americans’ preconceived notions about the
Balkans. Whereas the perceived nature of the Balkans was viewed in positive light at
the time of the Axis invasion, subsequent internal conflict evoked a pessimistic
manifestation of balkanism. Conveniently, the adoption of this view of the Balkans
also absolved the United States of responsibility for the contributions it had made to
Yugoslav discord, as this narrative instead emphasized the inherent nature of the
Yugoslavs themselves as the explanation for their country’s internal turmoil. Most
importantly, in regard to the formulation of policy, the satirical interpretation served as
the foundation for the longstanding beliefs of President Roosevelt. As this
interpretation gained credence, this diminished the will of the President or members of
the State Department to engage in the seemingly Sisyphean effort of solving
Yugoslavia’s political disputes.
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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

As this paper has shown, an examination of the narratives about Yugoslavia that
were adopted over the course of World War II provides insight into the factors that
influenced US policy decisions. Each policy decision was preceded by the rise of
particular narrative that called for a particular type of governmental action or inaction.
The initial dominance of the romantic narrative called for support of Mihailović,
which the US duly pledged. The attack upon this narrative, the rise of the romantic
narrative about Tito, and the comedic narrative of unity, all encouraged a
reexamination of the United States’ pro-Mihailović policy. The tragic narrative
demanded that the US be more proactive in resolving Yugoslavia’s internal turmoil.
This was countered by the satirical narrative, which encouraged the US to remain
politically uninvolved in the Yugoslav affairs. While the US governmental adamantly
adhered to its insistence that its decisions were based upon military considerations,
these narratives created the space that determined the scope and direction of those
decisions. While I do not claim that narratives were the sole driver of US policy, it is
apparent that once particular narratives gained dominance, they guided policy-making
toward a particular course of action and deterred consideration of alternative policies.
This can be seen in the case of the comedic narrative, which emphasized Yugoslav
unity and discouraged consideration of the postwar division of Yugoslavia.
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It could be argued that particular narratives were merely adopted or
instrumentalized in order to promote desired, predetermined policies. For instance, it
is certainly the case that communists intentionally influenced the narratives about
Mihailović and Tito in order to shift US policy and thus abet a communist revolution
within Yugoslavia. However, narratives also served as a basis for why individuals
perceived of a course of action or outcome as desirable. The initial romantic narrative
about Mihailović’s resistance served as an imperative for US support of the Četniks
that went beyond the consideration of US interests. This can be seen in the emotional
message sent by Roosevelt’s son requesting aid to the Četniks. The dominance of the
romantic narrative, with its emphasis upon the heroism and victimization of the Serbs,
also explains why Roosevelt sympathized with the postwar aspirations of the PanSerbs. Linn Farish’s later report, which epitomizes the tragic narrative, has no
ostensible political objective. Rather, the tragedy of the Yugoslav conflict
necessitated a change in US policy. An end to the tragedy, in and of itself, was
Farish’s desired outcome.
Each narrative presented a version of the “truth.” Some narratives were truer than
others in regard to historically verifiable facts. Mihailović’s resistance, as far as can
be determined, bore little resemblance to the way in which it was originally portrayed
to American public. The Serbs were certainly heroic in resisting the Axis occupiers to
the extent that they did. However, the romantic narrative of Četnik resistance could
not withstand close scrutiny. This does not mean that narratives gained ascendency or
declined simply due to the emergence of new information. Far more important was
how that information was interpreted. In the case of the romantic narrative, there were
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numerous factors that contributed to this process of interpretation, all of which related
to the way in which Americans viewed their own participation in the war and what
they construed as the war’s meaning. While the nature of Mihailović’s political aims,
or even if he had such aims, is disputed by historians, perhaps what is more relevant is
that a significant number of America’s liberal cultural producers came to see that the
Pan-Serb ideology to which they believed Mihailović adhered was the antithesis of
their own ideals. In this way, opposition to Mihailović and support for Tito tells us
more about American society than it necessarily does about events within Yugoslavia.
The comedic narrative proffered by the US government is perhaps the most
revealing in this regard. This might be viewed as the most artificial of all of the
narratives in that it was more often used as an imperative for proper action than it was
a description of reality. The preoccupation of many Americans with the Yugoslav
threat to unity reflected their concerns about their own society, particularly as they
related to the problem of race. While some acknowledged this American problem,
others lashed out at Serb nationalists as if they were introducing a contagion amongst
an otherwise healthy American public. The comedic narrative ultimately benefitted
Tito as he seemed to offer the panacea to Yugoslav ethnic strife. And there seems to
be “truth” to this interpretation as well, if only in hindsight, in that Tito did hold the
country together throughout his life as the postwar leader of Yugoslavia.
The tragic narrative might be viewed as the least effective of the narratives as it
did not seem to meaningfully impact government policy in the ways that those who
adopted this narrative hoped. However, the tragedy of US involvement in Yugoslavia
would have a prolific postwar life. The historiographical preoccupation with
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Communist influence can be viewed as a form of tragedy, wherein the United States
betrayed its ideals and obligations to Mihailović and the YGE due to its naïveté about
the nature of Tito’s aspirations.
As an examination of the rhetoric of government officials makes clear, the
satirical narrative both reflected and likely shaped US perceptions of Yugoslavia. This
narrative emphasized another questionable “truth” informed by what can be seen as a
manifestation of balkanism. There seemed to be facts upon which to base this
narrative. The dispute within Yugoslav did have an ethnic and religious basis. It was
also based upon historical grievances. However, in emphasizing these aspects of the
conflict, this narrative simultaneously deemphasized the role that the US had played in
creating and perpetuating Yugoslavia’s internal conflict. This allowed for the US to
eschew political involvement in Yugoslavia and wipe its hands of responsibility for a
conflict that was ancient and intractable. This does not mean that the satirical
narrative was opportunistically adopted in order to free the US from an obligation to
intercede on behalf of the Yugoslav people. FDR had an apparent genuine interest in
and sympathy for Yugoslavia. This interest diminished over time. The nature of the
satirical narrative explains, at least in part, this decline and why FDR abandoned his
stated consideration of a US military incursion into the Balkans. It also explains why
his Serbophile sympathies were not translated into a coherent policy.
Unfortunately, the satirical narrative would again become ascendant within the
United States as Yugoslavia descended into civil war in the 1990s, and once again it
engendered American inaction. As former US ambassador to the United Nations
Samantha Power wrote in her study of American policy and genocide in Yugoslavia
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during the dissolution of the state in the 1990s, Hillary Clinton reportedly “gave her
husband a copy of Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, a deftly written travel book that
portrays people in the Balkans as if they were destined to hate and kill.” It is
suspected that, after reading this book, President Clinton came to see Yugoslavia as a
potential “quagmire” and thus desired to avoid US involvement, such as military
intercession on behalf of Muslim Bosnians who were being slaughtered by Serb
nationalists.256
This thesis can be seen as a cautionary tale about the policy-making process
related to US foreign intervention. US policy was informed by simplistic
understandings of Yugoslavia. The dominance of the archetypal forms of the
discussed narratives reflected these simplistic understandings. The adoption of certain
narratives was undoubtedly facilitated by preconceived notions regarding the Balkans
and its inhabitants. This is most apparent in the romantic narrative of Serb resistance
and the satirical narrative of Yugoslavia’s ancient ethnic and religious hatreds. While
these narratives served as easily understandable conceptual frameworks, their lack of
complexity undermined the development of an accurate or predictive analysis related
to Yugoslavia. For instance, the romantic narrative served as a basis for US
expectations of the Serbs’ willingness and capability to fight the Axis. This faith
proved to be misplaced in regard to the initial invasion and subsequent resistance. It
also did not take into account the implications of the political aspirations of the Serb
nationalists and the ways in which these aspirations might alienate members of both
the Yugoslav and American public.
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While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the relationship between narratives and
foreign policy has the potential to explain the trajectory of other instances of US
foreign intervention. For example, the United States initially supported the anticommunist government of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. However, similar to
Mihailović’s suspected Pan-Serbism and the YGE’s questionable commitment to
democracy, Diem’s repressive rule alienated much of the Vietnamese population and
united communists and non-communists in resisting his rule. The US eventually saw
the folly of its policy and “stood aside and gave its blessing to a military coup” that
resulted in Diem’s assassination.257 Also like Yugoslavia, Vietnam would descend
into civil war and eventually come to be viewed by Americans as a quagmire. The
application of narrative theory might serve as an explanatory model for further
scholarly research on the course of US policy in not only Vietnam, but also places of
current US military involvement, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
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